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COMPLETING EXPUNGEMENT
Brian M. Murray *
INTRODUCTION
The limits of expungement are where the hope for real reentry
meet the desire for criminal justice transparency. That a criminal
record, ordered expunged by a judge after a long and arduous process, continues to exist in the world of private actors is a cold, harsh
reality for those attempting to reenter civil society. It is also reassurance for parents hiring a babysitter, school districts seeking
new employees, and employers concerned about workplace liability. Not to mention, the thought that all records of criminal justice
adjudication could be purged forever intuitively sounds Orwellian,1
even in an age where surveillance, whether governmental or corporatized,2 is the norm. Expungement—the process by which the
official, public data of a criminal record is erased, sealed, or made
private3—remains an important tool in the battle against stigma
and over-punishment after one formally leaves the criminal justice
system. But technological and big data realities, coupled with
transparency norms, will forever affect its efficacy. The internet is
not going away, and private actors will always feel entitled to hold
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would like to
thank The Hon. Stephanos Bibas for encouraging me to study expungement from various
angles; my former colleagues at Community Legal Services of Philadelphia for introducing
me to expungement law; and participants at CrimFest 2020, the Rutgers-Seton Hall Colloquium Series, Michigan Law School Junior Scholars Forum 2021, and others for providing
feedback on the ideas that generated this Article. I would also like to thank my wife, Katherine, for her continuous support, and my children, Elizabeth, Eleanor, George, John, and
Lucy, for their inspiring curiosity, endless questions, sense of wonder, and zealous love for
life.
1. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949) (repeating how the State always was at
peace with Eurasia and then always at war with Eurasia).
2. See generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE
FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (arguing that the current time is one characterized by surveillance, whether conducted by corporations for profitmaking purposes or government for law enforcement).
3. I use these terms interchangeably throughout this Article, recognizing that the terminology means different things in different jurisdictions. All of these terms are linked to
the term “expungement.”
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a default position that allows for the dissemination of public information about the criminal justice system, as that sentiment finds
support in the history and expectations underlying the transparent
administration of the legal system.4 For the successful expungement petitioner, a game of whack-a-mole is and will remain the
norm. A sense of powerlessness to move on from one’s past, like the
criminal record, persists.
The inability of expungement law to fully eradicate criminal records that have been ordered expunged is the fruit of a confluence
of factors, has been studied by scholars before, and experienced by
the legal practitioners who must stare into the face of a client who
has done everything right (when pursuing lawful expungement)
only to see things continue to go wrong. For starters, the sharing
of such data—especially intuitively interesting criminal record history information—only continues to increase, and at warp speed.5
The synchronizing of records within and across criminal justice
systems has a long history.6 This renders any attempt to combat
their transmission and spread an effort characterized by mitigation instead of eradication. Efforts at mitigation also jive with the
view—held by many and enshrined in legal norms—that the private dissemination of public data is necessary to a healthy polity
in order to hold public officials and public policies accountable.7
And private actors—at least in the United States—automatically
default to a posture that prefers transparency over privacy in criminal justice and the actions of government overall.8 These realities
will forever shape the reach of a remedy like expungement and are
unlikely to change. They also communicate to petitioners who have
had a judge order the expungement of their official criminal record
that the worst moment of their lives will remain in the hands of
4. Sarah Esther Lageson, There’s No Such Thing as Expunging a Criminal Record
Anymore, SLATE (Jan. 7, 2019, 2:44 PM), https://www.slate.com/technology/2019/01/crimin
al-record-expungement-internet-due-process.html [https://perma.cc/X6TQ-VLXU].
5. See ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 53 (describing the pace at which surveillance business
models have increased over the past ten to fifteen years).
6. See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 13–31 (2015); Susan E.
Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1997) (describing places where private information appears
online and in government databases).
7. For example, the Freedom of Information Act is built on this premise. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once said that “every citizen should
be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.” Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
8. The importance of transparency within the criminal justice system has a long history, enshrined in decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. See infra section
II.B.1.
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private actors willing to share it with whomever will pay the right
price.9
In truth, expungement was always somewhat of a paradox: a
remedy conceived in hope but forged through an accompanying set
of procedures that diminished that promise, limiting its relief to
the fortunate few rather than the necessary many.10 The procedural limits of expungement law have always stunted the potential
of the remedy, and there is no sign that that will change anytime
soon, although the move by a few states towards automated expungement again provides a glimmer of hope.11 But even then, automated expungement of public data will not touch the private digital spaces that retain information that has been ordered
expunged. This, after all, is what Eldar Haber and Sarah Lageson
have labeled digital punishment, leading to calls for “digital expungement,”12 and for state governments to refrain from publicly
conveying criminal records as a matter of policy.13 And as Shoshana Zuboff has argued, this age is one where the accumulation
of information from the past and present is the very lifeblood of the
economy.14 Scholars across legal fields have recognized this problem and called for a mix of public policy solutions designed to ameliorate its effects, attempting to thread the needle between privacy
and transparency.15

9. Public criminal record history information is routinely sold to private third parties.
JACOBS, supra note 6, at 70–90.
10. See, e.g., Brian M. Murray, Retributive Expungement, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (2021).
11. After a Haul of Record Relief Reforms in 2020, More States Launch Clean Slate
Campaigns, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Feb. 17, 2021), https://ccresourcecen
ter.org/2021/02/17/after-a-haul-of-record-relief-reforms-last-year-more-states-launch-cleanslate-campaigns [https://perma.cc/4WMM-P98R].
12. See generally Eldar Haber, Digital Expungement, 77 MD. L. REV. 337 (2018) (describing need for digital remedies in a digital world); SARAH ESTHER LAGESON, DIGITAL
PUNISHMENT: PRIVACY, STIGMA, AND THE HARMS OF DATA-DRIVEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2020)
(characterizing online criminal records as akin to punishment).
13. Sarah Esther Lageson, Elizabeth Webster & Juan R. Sandoval, Digitizing and Disclosing Personal Data: The Proliferation of State Criminal Records on the Internet, 46 L. &
SOC. INQUIRY 635 (2021).
14. ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 10.
15. See generally id. (discussing potential constitutional and investigative approaches
proposed by legal scholars); Lageson, supra note 4 (encouraging localities to modify recordkeeping policies rather than defaulting to eternal publicity); Haber, supra note 12, at 382,
384 (recommending digital remedies in a post-kinetic world that map rehabilitative purposes of expungement); Alessandro Corda, More Justice and Less Harm: Reinventing Access
to Criminal History Records, 60 HOW. L.J. 1, 42–49 (2016) (advocating for proportionality
constraints on recordkeeping); Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 515, 527–34 (2015) (arguing for statutory rights to be forgotten and reinvigoration of Fair Credit Reporting Act); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Privacy, Public
Records, and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002) (proposing a way to balance
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One response to this issue has arisen in European law: the socalled right to be forgotten (“RTBF”). This right of individuals to
seek expungement of information held by third-party vendors,
online platforms, and other entities operating on the internet, is
controversial. Google, for example, has fought it tooth and nail, and
until recently, mostly won.16 Even when it has lost, the margin of
victory for the public is debatable as firms like it continue to traffic
in the “breadcrumbs” of information available on the web. Conceived in a robust understanding of privacy and reputation that
has more solid footing in European law than American law to date,
the RTBF has gained some traction and led to relief for parties unable to move on after encountering the criminal justice system.17
But generally speaking, the right to be forgotten has not gained
traction in the United States. Skepticism persists,18 founded on existing legal doctrines relating to privacy, reputation, the protections of the First Amendment (especially for media organizations),
and the general desire to make the activities of the government
(especially in the criminal justice system) as public as possible. The
latter point is especially important, as the spotlight on the decision-making and discretion of public officials in the criminal justice
system has only increased in recent years.19 Plenty of members of
the public are skeptical of informational control by the press, yet
oddly mostly unconcerned with the capitalization of human behavior.20 As such, the right to be forgotten—as initially conceived—is
unlikely to be recognized on a widespread basis anytime soon in
American law or public policy and will be fiercely resisted by corporations. Another solution is necessary for addressing the plight
of the successful expungement petitioner who has encountered the
limits of expungement law.
This Article addresses this problem which, at its core, is a problem that persists in any field of public law: the inability of public
remedies to fully anticipate the myriad ways in which private actors and incentives can undercut the intended efficacy of a legal
transparency and privacy when allowing access to public records of all types).
16. Google Fights Plan to Extend ‘Right to be Forgotten’, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45484300 [https://perma.cc/QG6M-KFZH].
17. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88–
89 (2012).
18. See, e.g., id. at 88, 90–91.
19. See, e.g., The Manuals Initiative: How Transparent Are Policing Manuals?,
POLICING PROJECT: N.Y.U. (2020), https://www.policingproject.org/manuals-overview-findi
ngs [https://perma.cc/F3WU-J2YA] (attempting to publicize police manuals nationwide).
20. See ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 5, 10.
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regime. The successful expungement petitioner essentially faces a
“follow-through” problem that the state, by virtue of the nature of
the remedy itself, other legal norms, and technological and market
realities beyond its control, is incapable of fully resolving. At most,
expungement regimes offer a blunt instrument to mitigate the
harmful effects of a public criminal record. They permit the removal of official data, but complete erasure is a legal myth, and for
some people whose records are more notorious or simply in the
hands of a private actor falling into one of the camps above, that
myth comes with the terror of a never-ending nightmare.
What can be done? This Article suggests that given the current
legal landscape, the solution to the persistent existence and usage
of public criminal records after expungement remedies have been
exhausted does not rest in the creation of a formal right to be forgotten or something similar. In fact, forging that right would be to
attempt a degree of conscription of privately held data that is unlikely to be welcomed nor easily legislated. It also mistakenly assumes a determinate nature to the law, as if the whack-a-mole
problem can be truly eradicated.21 And it runs counter to present
day norms relating to accessing public information, even if consonant with earlier views of access.22 That right uncomfortably pits
the interests of the formerly arrested and convicted against the
broader, and generally held belief that private actors can express
themselves, for the most part, as they please, and run their businesses on an “at-will”23 basis. There are, after all, reasonable uses
of criminal record history information; the issue is where to draw

21. While beyond the scope of this Article, the underlying jurisprudential contention is
that the positive law cannot possibly account for all the variations of human experience, nor
anticipate all future legal problems.
22. Solove, supra note 15, at 1155 (noting how early U.S. courts permitted limited access to public documents). Solove details how common law permitted access to public records
based on the person’s reason for seeking the information. Id. at 1156 (citing Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972)); Matthew D. Bunker, Sigman L. Splichal, Bill
F. Chamberlin & Linda M. Perry, Access to Government-Held Information in the Computer
Age: Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 543, 556 (1993)
(“Most states depended on the discretion of agencies, or on the common law, to provide public access to government records until they were inspired by the federal FOIA to codify the
concept of open government.”).
23. The rule of at-will employment is well-entrenched, although limited by certain civil
rights laws. Aside from a few judicial rulings relating to the enforcement of Title VII, and
the since retracted Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Guidance on the
Usage of Criminal Records, the ability of civil rights laws to counteract the stigma associated with a public criminal record is minimal. See, e.g., Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433 (5th
Cir. 2019).
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the line and identifying where private action based on such information goes too far.
This Article contends that limitations on the use of information
that has been ordered expunged must come from a deeper, ethical
place that underlies the entire project of the criminal law within a
liberal, democratic society and that traffics in the field of responsibility rather than coercive power.24 In particular, it must come from
the roots of the average actor’s relationship to the criminal justice
system itself: the desire for that system and the processes associated with it do justice, and nothing more, or nothing less.25 In short,
the theoretical rationales underlying the punishment practices of
the criminal system itself must drive how actors conceive of the
usage of such information after it has been lawfully expunged.26
Legislative expungement remedies can only reach so far; expungement law, just like the criminal law itself,27 will always have a limited ability to redress social ills. The rest is the work of how private
actors conceive of the system, its limits, and their duties28 after the
system has operated. The right not to be over-punished—instead
of the right to be forgotten—requires as much work on the part of

24. This forecast exists against a legal and normative backdrop that is deferential to
the autonomy of private actors that drives questions like, “why can’t the business owner use
the prior conviction when making hiring decisions?” or “why isn’t prior flouting of the law
relevant to whether someone can be trusted?” This Article argues that while those questions
are understandable and reasonable, an answer requires a conception of responsibilities
based on the ethical norms underlying the criminal law and the justification for punishment.
25. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453,
477–78 (1997) (describing how justice-focused punishment accords with the inclinations of
the community and also encourages respect for the legitimacy of the criminal law).
26. Alessandro Corda has advanced a similar argument in More Justice: Less Harm,
which analyzes the punishment theory roots of public criminal recordkeeping by the state.
Corda, supra note 15, at 8–18. Corda makes the astute argument that public safety rationales led to the rise of the current criminal records regime, and that neither retributivist nor
utilitarian thinking fully supports the official recordkeeping regime that exists today. Id. at
42–44. This Article focuses on a different phenomenon: addressing the limits of expungement
law, and the ability of the law, if at all, to address the actions of private actors given those
limits, rather than the rationales underlying public criminal recordkeeping by the state.
27. See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968)
(“The rhetorical question that this book poses is: how can we tell what the criminal sanction
is good for?”).
28. I am indebted to the work of several scholars who have discussed the responsibilities and duties of private actors with respect to reentry. In particular, this Article draws on
the work of Christopher Bennett, see infra note 358; Dan Markel, see infra note 357; Mary
Sigler, see infra note 362; Jeffrie Murphy, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1985); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Remorse,
Apology, and Mercy, 4 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 423 (2007); Judge Stephanos Bibas, see Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 329 (2007); and
several others in advancing this argument in Part III, see, e.g., infra section I.A.
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private actors as it does on behalf of the state.29 Human actors
must prevent over-punishment because expungement law likely
cannot. But a theory connected to criminal justice, within a democratic polity, rather than privacy and reputation, provides stronger
legal justification for that move and can form structures to incentivize private action that helps ameliorate the problem.
In short, completing the project of expungement requires cognizance of the relational underpinnings of the criminal law and punishment within a democratic society rather than the creation of a
formal right to be forgotten. The law can support this goal mindful
of other legal commitments that carry serious weight. In making
this argument, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I details
the problem the Article addresses: the simultaneous promise and
limit of criminal record relief. Building on prior work and that of
other scholars, it surveys how criminal records relief has developed, as well as the limits of those remedies in light of existing
technological realities. Part II begins by describing one reaction to
those limits: the generation of the right to be forgotten in Continental Europe. European legal regimes have grounded the right in
robust definitions of privacy and reputation, tethered to alternative understandings of the purpose of the criminal justice system
for defendants and communities at large. These differences are significant when juxtaposed with the undercurrents driving general
American skepticism of such a right. Those undercurrents include
the limits of privacy and reputation as legal concepts,30 a general
default to transparency in criminal adjudication and procedure,
and the public-private norms associated with the First Amendment and the dissemination of information. Part II then spotlights
a few private actors, including newspapers and media organizations, that have sought to respond to this skepticism by constructing their own private procedures that resemble public
29. Margaret Love conceived this problem as the forgiving/forgetting distinction. Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, Redemption, and the Uniform
Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. L.J. 753 (2011).
30. This, of course, is not my own argument. Scholars like Daniel J. Solove and others
have been arguing that privacy and reputation provide little refuge for those seeking to
regulate the usage of harmful information. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 15, at 1176–95. In
the criminal law and civil rights space, the famous Supreme Court case of Paul v. Davis
essentially ended any hope for a right to reputation in the federal Constitution. 424 U.S.
693 (1976). Some state constitutions, however, have something resembling such a right,
although its strength is questionable. See, e.g., PA. CONST., art. I, § 1 (current through 2022
Reg. Session Act 9) (“All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing
their own happiness.”).
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expungement remedies.31 These actions are a response to two realities: (1) the limits of expungement law under state statutes; and
(2) that the right to be forgotten has not, and likely will not, gain
traction in American law.
In light of that conclusion, Part III contains the normative proposal given the above observations. In sum, it suggests that any
effort to address the limits of expungement law, and the actions of
private actors with respect to the continued existence of such information, must begin with the theory underlying the criminal law
and punishment itself, rather than concepts like privacy and reputation. The focus is on a state and private responsibility not to
over-punish rather than an individual right to be forgotten, effectively privatizing expungement once formal regimes reach their
limits. This idea corresponds with a robust notion of the relationship between private actors and the public criminal justice system,
and a conception of the system as one designed to foster reentry
rather than incapacitation.32 They also jive with already existing,
although imperfectly applied, understandings of punishment as
having limits based on what is deserved. Thus, and perhaps paradoxically, the limits of public expungement remedies require a public-private partnership that recognizes the state as the sole punisher and private actors as cognizant of their responsibility to
consider refraining from causing additional harm after punishment. The limits of formal expungement must meet the informal
duties of private actors for the full promise of expungement to be
achieved.
This grounding in punishment theory can fill the gap left by the
limits of expungement law, leading to a more charitable relationship between private actors and public criminal record history information, while preserving the potential for transparency should
it be necessary. It attempts to thread the needle, recognizing the
need to ground the ability to move on from a public criminal record
in a theory of criminal justice that conceives a role for the community, rather than broad, amorphous legal concepts like privacy or
reputation. It does not pit transparency and reentry against one
31. I first discussed expungement by newspapers in Brian M. Murray, Newspaper Expungement, 116 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 68 (2021). Section II.C builds from that treatment
to support the arguments of this Article.
32. Of course, there are many alternative ways of viewing the primary purpose of the
criminal justice system and institutions of punishment. In making the normative argument
referenced here, I conceive of the purpose as primarily restorative. For additional insight
into this theory, which builds from a tradition spanning two millennia, see Brian M. Murray,
Restorative Retributivism, 75 U. MIA. L. REV. 855 (2021).
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another. Instead, it demands that the relationship of private actors
to the broader purposes of the criminal justice system be taken seriously, allowing the promise of just punishment, and nothing more
or nothing less, to transcend the limits of expungement.
But this argument also comes with a caveat: it is contingent on
recognition that private use of already expunged information is, in
fact, punitive rather than not.33 In the event that such activities
cannot be labeled punitive, the argument has a tweak—that the
relationships that comprise existence within a democratic polity
are the source for reconceiving the boundaries for usage of such
information. On balance, regardless of the path taken, either normative rationale is more promising than formal creation of a right
to be forgotten given other legal commitments and social and economic realities. This approach can transcend the formal limits of
expungement law, permit the completion of expungement’s aspirations, and avoid disturbing legitimate concerns about transparency in the criminal justice system and the compelled erasure of
privately held information.
I. THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF CRIMINAL RECORD RELIEF
Criminal records relief has been front and center for nearly two
decades at this point. Originating with a movement to expand expungement remedies in the early 2000s,34 the latest reforms call
for automatic expungement for public arrest and conviction history
information.35 Given that nearly a third of the adult population of
33. I am aware that some would not label private activity on the basis of criminal records “punishment.” My understanding is that this is because such activity is based on the
conduct underlying the criminal records, and is private, not state action. I am not convinced
that argument holds for automatic collateral consequences imposed by the state. For private, discretionary consequences permitted by the state, my position is a bit different. The
basis for such activity in many instances is almost always the formal recognition—either by
arrest or conviction—of the conduct as sanctionable (e.g., the conviction or arrest operates
to justify the private activity). While I concede that such private activity is not formal punishment under current doctrine, because it is not inflicted by the state, this does not mean
it cannot have punitive attributes. And punitive activity on the part of one party against
another party with usage of official information as a proxy for such activity requires justification in civil society.
34. Ram Subramanian, Rebecka Moreno & Sophia Gebreselassie, Relief in Sight? States
Rethink the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 2009–2014, VERA INST.
FOR JUST. (2014), https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/relief-in-sight-states-rethi
nk-the-collateral-consequences-of-criminal-conviction-2009-2014/legacy_downloads/statesrethink-collateral-consequences-summary-v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8YT-VJ8G].
35. See Dozens of New Expungement Laws Already Enacted in 2021, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (July 7, 2021), https://ccresourcecenter.org/2021/07/07/dozens-ofnew-expungement-laws-already-enacted-in-2021 [https://perma.cc/8CEG-Q9QB].
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the United States has had some contact with the system,36 and private companies profit in the criminal records business,37 the issue
of their public existence remains salient. One tool to combat their
effect is expungement.
But expungement law has not lived up to its full promise despite
reforms. Every state has its own regime, there is no federal standard, and private companies retain information despite the expungement of official, governmental data, and with few repercussions.38 In the digital information age, data is everywhere for the
taking, and online platforms, corporations, indexes, search engines, and other private companies desire to acquire it at an incredible rate. There is a market for airing the dirty laundry of others, even if done so inaccurately.
This Part traces the story of expungement. It begins with the
promise of a clean slate, only to see petitioners run into obstacle
after obstacle due to the substantive and procedural limits of the
remedy, as well as the limits of the law to keep pace with the digital
accumulation and dissemination of criminal history information.
A. The Promise
For the job applicant, prospective tenant, or professional student
training to obtain a license in a particular field, expungement regimes advertise the opportunity to put the past in the rear-view
mirror for good. And in fairness, expungement helps a lot of people;
36. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT,
65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS
FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (2011), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/65_Million_
Need_Not_Apply.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5TG-23RJ] (noting that over 25% of the adult population has a criminal record); Jo Craven McGinty, How Many Americans Have a Police
Record? Probably More than You Think, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/howmany-americans-have-a-police-record-probably-more-than-you-think-1438939802 [https://
perma.cc/6NKZ-KW57] (Aug. 7, 2015, 11:59 AM) (“It’s often reported that nearly 1 in 3
American adults, or about 30%, has a police record. . . . [That figure] may be low.”).
37. James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 401 (2006) (“Some private information brokers obtain court records
en masse. Credit bureaus have always obtained information on individual criminal history
from court records.”); see James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and
Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 180–81 (2008) (offering a brief history of federal involvement in state record keeping efforts). Jacobs and
Crepet also catalog how commercial vendors purchase this information, in bulk, from state
record repositories. Id. at 185–86.
38. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 37, at 186 (“An internet search for ‘criminal records’
yields dozens of companies offering, for a modest fee, to carry out criminal background
checks for employment, housing, and other purposes. These companies are somewhat regulated by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).”).
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the data suggests that achieving an expungement does improve the
chances of positive employment and reentry outcomes, like avoiding recidivism.39 Because collateral consequences can be either
state enforced or exacted by private actors, expungement can
heighten the chances of reentry.40
Expungement remedies originated when rehabilitation theory
was popular, driving policy determinations by legislatures and
reentry policymakers.41 Juvenile offenders were the first to gain
the possibility of the remedy.42 As James Jacobs wrote, “[t]he purpose of this policy . . . is to encourage rehabilitation and to recognize that a previously convicted offender has succeeded in turning
his life around.”43 Expungement’s promise was twofold: to reward
the rehabilitated and hasten it for those who were considered to be
very close,44 with the added benefit of fueling positive reentry by
removing the obstacles that emerged in the wake of a public criminal record.45

39. See generally Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, Recognizing Redemption: Old
Criminal Records and Employment Outcomes, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271 (2017)
(“[T]hose possessing older criminal records still face barriers when seeking employment.”);
Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 11
(2016) (“One of the most punitive collateral consequences of conviction is the impact of a
criminal record on the likelihood of securing employment. Research . . . consistently demonstrates that employment is correlated with lower rates of reoffending and therefore with
successful reentry.”).
40. Haber, supra note 12, at 344 (describing how collateral consequences can be sponsored by the state or the result of social decisions by private actors).
41. Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1326 (2017) (“During the
1960s and 1970s, states endorsed a rehabilitative ideal as an integral part of the criminal
justice system.”).
42. Fred C. Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of Convictions Set Aside Under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 477, 482–84 (discussing juvenile expungement as a
response to the desire to rehabilitate youth offenders).
43. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 113–14.
44. Aidan R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult
Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 162 (noting how expungement
provides juvenile offenders “an incentive to reform” by “removing the infamy of [their] social
standing”); Love, supra note 29, at 1710 (“The purpose of judicial expungement or set-aside
was to both encourage and reward rehabilitation, by restoring social status as well as legal
rights.”); Michael D. Mayfield, Comment, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information
in the Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1997) (“In an attempt to alleviate
the effects of such ostracism, and to help offenders reenter society, federal and state governments created expungement laws designed to conceal criminal records from the public.”).
45. While I have canvassed the numerous collateral consequences facing those with a
criminal record in prior work, other scholars have done so comprehensively. See, e.g.,
MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, JENNY ROBERTS & CECILIA M. KLINGELE, COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013).
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B. The Substantive Limits of the Remedies
Expungement regimes vary in their breadth and depth, meaning
that the promise is narrower for some and wider for others. The
substance of expungement law—meaning who is eligible and which
types of information may be expunged—vary from state to state.46
There is no uniform standard for expungement remedies, although
scholars have proposed certain best practices throughout the
years.
Expungement regimes thus represent a patchwork of approaches, partly due to the historical fact that expungement began
in some places as a judicially-created remedy, where courts interpreted state constitutions to permit the remedy in limited circumstances.47 Additionally, early courts crafted the remedy from different, yet sometimes blended premises, like concerns about
privacy or rehabilitation.48 These early courts essentially created a
double inquiry: an assessment of the petitioner’s riskiness and
whether the continued maintenance of the public criminal record
would inflict more harm than good.49
This led to a restriction of the remedy to very few people. A minority of prior offenders—and usually only arrestees rather than
those who had been convicted—could pursue expungement. For the
lucky few who remained eligible despite having been convicted,
proof of some sort of rehabilitation was usually a requirement.50

46. MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION: FAIR CHANCE AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN
2018 9–13 (2019), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Fair-chance-and
-expungement-reforms-in-2018-CCRC-Jan-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BVG-5PTZ].
47. See Murray, supra note 10, at 683–85.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Meinken v. Burgess, 426 S.E.2d 876, 879 (Ga. 1993); Commonwealth v.
Wexler, 431 A.2d 877, 879 (Pa. 1981); Brian M. Murray, Retributivist Reform of Collateral
Consequences, 52 CONN. L. REV. 863, 913 (2020) (“In effect, courts were tasked with engaging in cost-benefit calculations about offender riskiness rather than contemplating whether
the individual actually deserved to have a public criminal record after serving the initial
sentence.”); Walter W. Steele, Jr., A Suggested Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses of
Criminal Records, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 32, 54 (1972) (referencing, in model statute, how
waiting period conveyed rehabilitation).
50. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12:55:080 (1962); REV. CODES OF MONT. § 94-7821 (1965
Supp.); ORE. COMP. LAWS § 26-1234 (1940); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-17 (1953); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a (West Supp. 1966); IDAHO CODE § 19-2604 (1965 Supp.); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 176.340 (1963); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.240 (1957); Commonwealth v. D.M., 695
A.2d 770, 773 (Pa. 1997) (granting automatic expungement of charges resulting in acquittal).
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Early statutory expungement regimes followed suit, tethering relief to assessments of moral character.
Between 1980 and 2010, legislatures expanded expungement relief. More types of arrest and court information were eligible for
expungement and the types of offenses that were eligible for expungement also increased. The expungement of arrest information
remained the norm, although many states allowed for the expungement of at least some convictions.
Beginning in the last decade, the pace of expungement reform
increased rapidly. The Collateral Consequences Resource Center
(“CCRC”) has tracked such progress. As the CCRC stated in January 2019, states have “pursued a dizzying variety of approaches,
reducing waiting periods and expanding eligibility, including for
misdemeanors and some low-level felonies, and expediting relief
for non-conviction and juvenile records. . . .”51
More than two-thirds of states now permit expungement of convictions, including felonies.52 The progression is somewhat predictable. States begin by permitting the expungement of low-level misdemeanor convictions before transitioning to allowing some felony
offenses.53 Maryland is a good example of this process.54
Although the breadth has increased, variation remains for
which offenses are eligible. For example, Illinois permits the

51.
52.

LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 46, at 9.
MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.,
FROM REENTRY TO REINTEGRATION: CRIMINAL RECORD REFORMS IN 2021 2 (2022), https://
ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2022_CCRC_Annual-Report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z57H-WHX4].
53. See, e.g., ARK CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-1406 to -1408 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72706 (2022); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374 (2021); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2 (2021); IND.
CODE §§ 35-38-9-1 to -6 (2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6614 (2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 431.073 (LexisNexis 2021); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 978 (2021); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 10-110 (LexisNexis 2021); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2022); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 780.621 (2022); MINN. STAT. § 609A.02 (2021); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71
(2021); MO. REV. STAT. § 610.140 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.245 (2020); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:52-2 (West 2021); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.59 (LexisNexis 2022); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-145.5 (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02(9) (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32
(LexisNexis 2021); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 18(a) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.225 (2021); 12
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2 (2018); S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-920 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4032-101(g), (k) (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-105 (LexisNexis 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 7602 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.640 (2021); W. VA CODE § 61-11-26 (2022); WIS.
STAT. § 973.015 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1501 to -1502 (2021).
54. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-301(f)(1)–(12) (LexisNexis 2021) (listing “shieldable conviction[s],” including but not limited to disorderly conduct, possession of a controlled
substance or drug paraphernalia, and driving without a license).
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expungement of almost all convictions.55 New York’s law is similar,
but makes relief contingent on whether the individual has other
serious offenses.56 A state like California, for instance, began with
drug-related convictions.57 Indiana allows for a broad range of offenses to be expunged, but the promise of full erasure really only
extends to the lower-level convictions.58 The norm seems to be gradation amongst offenses: states like North Carolina,59 Kentucky,60
Ohio,61 Michigan,62 Rhode Island,63 and Tennessee64 allow the expungement of convictions, as long as certain preconditions are met,
such as a short criminal history or an extended period without recidivating.
These substantive changes certainly represent a “new normal”
when it comes to expungement law, where “relief is not reserved
just for nonconviction and acquittal charges.”65 These trends highlight the ever-growing promise of expungement. But while legislatures have broadened remedies, they have done little to ease their
operationalization. Procedural hurdles to expungement are common, and when coupled with socio-economic and other realities for
prospective petitioners, the consequences can be fatal for one’s pursuit of records relief.
C. The Procedural Limits of the Remedies
Expungement procedure undercuts the promise of substantive
reform by erecting hurdles for petitioners that exacerbate already
existing social conditions.66 These obstacles come in many forms—
tedious filing requirements, monetary barriers, waiting periods,
prosecutorial intervention, and hearing standards that are not favorable to petitioners.

55. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2 (2021).
56. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.59 (LexisNexis 2022).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(e)(1) (Deering 2021).
58. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-6(a)(1) (2016); see also Joseph C. Dugan, Note, I Did My
Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Expungement Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1321, 1341–42 &
nn.129–37 (2015).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-145.5 (2021).
60. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078 (LexisNexis 2021).
61. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.31–32 (2021).
62. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.621 (2022).
63. 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-3 (2021).
64. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(2), (k) (2021).
65. Murray, supra note 10, at 690.
66. In this section, I draw on my previous work. See generally id.
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Formal requirements for filing for expungement are cost prohibitive and so time consuming that they deter the pursuit of relief.67
Having to track down paperwork from multiple agencies, verify its
accuracy as it relates to one’s personal information, obtain fingerprints, and synchronize petitions and filings requires a level of legal sophistication beyond the average lay petitioner. There also is
a high opportunity cost given other obligations in one’s daily life.
Expungement’s early procedure thus creates access to justice problems.68 And even in states where automated relief has been approved by the legislature, other procedural mechanisms—such as
waiting periods and implementation requirements—suggest hurdles will remain.
Monetary barriers to expungement persist despite the broadening of remedies. Most petitioners have low incomes.69 Because expungement varies state by state, different places have different
costs for expungement. Within some states, counties have different
fees.70 And that is not counting the lost income from trekking all
over the place to put together a petition, with the time required for
such trips a luxury of those with flexible economic and social situations.71 While some places have moved to eliminate fees, the price
of expungement is generally high.72

67. See J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical Study, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2466 n.24 (2020) (noting how Michigan State police
suggested low expungement rates existed due to failures to apply). For a greater discussion
of how onerous procedures limit access to justice, see id. at 2521–22; see also Colleen Chien,
America’s Paper Prisons: The Second Chance Gap, 119 MICH. L. REV. 519, 554 (2020).
68. Prescott & Starr, supra note 67, at 2478 (“[W]hen criminal justice relief mechanisms
require individuals to go through application procedures, many people who might benefit
from them will not do so.”); Murray, supra note 10, at 690–92 (describing state processes).
69. See Theresa Zhen, How Court Debt Erects Permanent Barriers to Reentry,
TALKPOVERTY (Apr. 28, 2016), https://talkpoverty.org/2016/04/28/how-court-debt-erectspermanent-barriers-to-reentry [https://perma.cc/M3AM-79GK] (“One of the most significant
barriers to reentry is the imposition of fines, fees, surcharges, costs, and other monetary
penalties.”).
70. AD HOC COMM. ON BONDING PRACS., FINES & FEES IN MUN. CTS., AD HOC
COMMITTEE REPORT ON BONDING PRACTICES, FINES AND FEES IN MUNICIPAL COURTS 39
(Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.kscourts.org/KSCourts/media/KsCourts/court%20administra
tion/AdHocCommitteeMunicipalCourtsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS2L-GVC8].
71. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 67, at 2503–04 (“[T]hose without cash on hand may
not have the liquidity or ability to make such an investment or may be reluctant to do so
when the long-term benefits are speculative.”).
72. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-90-1419 (2021) (filing fee waived for filing of uniform
petition in Arkansas); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-905 (LexisNexis 2021) (eliminating application
fees for expungement in Arizona); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(d)(1.5), (6)(C) (2021)
(eliminating fees to expunge charges resulting in acquittal, dismissal, or a conviction later
reversed or vacated in counties with more than 3,000,000 people, and providing that a court
cannot deny an expungement petition because of an unpaid court debt); see also Arizona HB
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In jurisdictions where convictions are now eligible for expungement, full payment of fines is required before any type of expungement is possible. While completion of one’s sentence seems like a
reasonable condition for expungement, this hurdle can result in the
inability to ever obtain relief, especially if one’s criminal record is
the reason one cannot obtain employment.73 Furthermore, it is not
the case that all financial liabilities after a criminal case are part
of the sentence; rather, sometimes such debt is the result of processing and other administrative fees.74
The most onerous procedural requirement faced by petitioners
relates to waiting periods. Waiting periods are often justified as
necessary to ensure that an individual petitioner is in fact rehabilitated and worthy of an expungement.75 Some states have blanket
waiting periods for classes of offenses, whereas others opt for gradated schemes based on the seriousness of the offense.76
As documented elsewhere, prosecutors wield statutory-based
powers to intervene in the expungement process.77 While it has become more popular for prosecutors to assist with expungement,78
2312: Relating to Setting Aside a Conviction, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/arizona-hb-2312-setting-aside-fee [https://per
ma.cc/WFM6-368T] (expressing support for the Arizona law); Illinois HB 5341: Amendment,
Criminal Identification Act Section 5.2, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/illinois-hb-5341-amendment-criminal-identifi
cation-act-section-5-2 [https://perma.cc/94YP-QMSE] (expressing support for the Illinois
law).
73. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 610.140(5)(3) (2021) (requiring petitioners to pay fines
and restitutions before expungement); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3A-5 (2020) (same); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-72-706(1)(c) (2022) (same); Frequently Asked Questions About Clean Slate, CMTY.
LEGAL SERV. OF PHILA. (June 26, 2018), https://clsphila.org/employment/frequently-askedquestions-about-clean-slate [https://perma.cc/WYQ5-PYCY] (advising payment of fines and
fees before applying for expungement); Monica Llorente, Criminalizing Poverty Through
Fines, Fees, and Costs, AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups
/litigation/committees/childrens-rights/articles/2016/criminalizing-poverty-fines-fees-costs
[https://perma.cc/WWN6-YTM7] (finding that people cannot vacate their records to regain
their rights until they pay their financial obligations to the court).
74. MATTHEW MENENDEZ, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY, LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, & NOAH
ATCHISON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST, THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND
FINES 6 (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/steep-costs-crimi
nal-justice-fees-and-fines [https://perma.cc/3K86-T578].
75. Murray, supra note 10, at 695 (“[T]he theory behind waiting periods is the same
that supported expungement half a century ago: those who have not recidivated and shown
good behavior are now worth the risk.”).
76. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2630/5.2(c) (2021); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC.
§ 10-303(a) (LexisNexis 2021); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 977(2) (2021); Murray, supra
note 10, at 695.
77. See Brian M. Murray, Unstitching Scarlet Letters?: Prosecutorial Discretion and Expungement, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2821, 2847–48 (2018).
78. Sealing a Criminal Conviction, MANHATTAN DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.manh
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prosecutors retain the ability to make life difficult for petitioners
through the usage of technical objections.79 Prosecutors can prevent expungement themselves in some states,80 and at the very
least stall the process, causing petitioners to lose valuable time.81
In some states, prosecutors are given quasi-judicial, prescreening
authority for petitions.82 And these powers persist even in places
where automatic expungement has been pursued.83
Finally, the hearing standards for expungement petitions are
mixed, with some placing the burden on petitioners to justify expungement, rather than questioning why the state should be able
to publicize the information forever.84 For example, Delaware’s
attanda.org/sealing [https://perma.cc/F6MV-3HKG]; Through Groundbreaking Class Action, Hundreds of New Yorkers Have Old Marijuana Convictions Sealed, MANHATTAN DIST.
ATT’Y’S OFF. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.lac.org/news/through-groundbreaking-class-act
ion-hundreds-of-new-yorkers-have-old-marijuana-convictions-sealed [https://perma.cc/9B3
8-F7Q2].
79. See Murray, supra note 77.
80. Michigan allows prosecutors to prevent expungement. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 28.243(8)–(10) (2022). Georgia gives prosecutors a fixed period of time to object on technical grounds. GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(2) (2021). Prosecutorial objection also can
heighten the degree of scrutiny given to a petition. Id. § 35-3-37(n)(3).
81. The District of Columbia Code is a good example of how prosecutorial review and
potential objection adds delay to the process. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-805(b)–(e) (2022).
Prosecutors also can object to force hearings in front of judges who are skeptical of expungement. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-37(n)(3) (2021) (allowing prosecutors to decline an
individual’s request to their criminal history record information, which leads to a civil action
to remedy the prosecutorial discretion). But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-704(1)(c) (2021)
(allowing judges to determine whether grounds for a hearing exist).
82. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-704(1)(c)(II) (2022); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 7602(a)(3) (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-909(B) (LexisNexis 2021) (“If the prosecutor
does not oppose the application, the court may grant the application and vacate the conviction without a hearing.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1413(b)(2)(B)(i) (2021) (“If notice of opposition is not filed, the court may grant the uniform petition.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(d)
(Deering 2022) (“In any case where a person has been arrested and an accusatory pleading
has been filed, but where no conviction has occurred, the court may, with the concurrence
of the prosecuting attorney, grant the relief provided in subdivision (b) at the time of the
dismissal of the accusatory pleading.”); see also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2(d)(6)(B) (2021)
(requiring the court to grant or deny a petition if no objection is filed); IND. CODE § 35-38-99(a) (2019) (allowing a court to grant a petition for expungement without a hearing if the
prosecutor does not object); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-303(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2021)
(allowing a court to grant a petition for shielding criminal records if the State’s Attorney
does not file an objection); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-11 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7740-103(9) (LexisNexis 2021) (allowing a court to grant a petition for expungement without
a hearing if no objection is received); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(F) (Cum. Supp. 2021) (allowing a court to enter an order of expungement without conducting a hearing if the prosecutor gives written notice that they (1) do not object to the order and (2) the continued existence of the record would be unjust to the petitioner).
83. For example, in California, local prosecutors can object to the expungement of information otherwise eligible for automatic expungement. Prosecutors, thus, can subvert legislative will. LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 46, at 11.
84. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-803(i)(2)–(3) (2022) (placing the burden on the movant for
petitions relating to convictions); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-90-1415(a)–(e) (2021) (placing
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new law places the burden on the “petitioner to allege specific facts
in support of that petitioner’s allegation of manifest injustice[.]”85
Balancing tests, however, provide judges ample discretion to determine whether expungement is appropriate, and the ability to scrutinize the prospects of the petitioner.86 In sum, petitioners, once
they arrive at a hearing, are by no means guaranteed a positive
result.87
D. The Technological Limits of the Remedies
Although the reforms mentioned above have limits, they have
expanded the ability of petitioners to eliminate public, official
criminal history information. But even if someone manages to get
past the procedural hurdles, such reforms are rarely coupled with
provisions that permit the regulation of the dissemination of such
information once it is held by private parties. Furthermore, existing expungement law does little to respond to the exceptional pace
at which such information travels across the internet and from one
actor to another. In other words, the promise of substantive expungement reform does little to regulate the secondary market in
such information, which is fortified by a data driven economy.
This means expungement can only accomplish so much in reality. In the past, the limits of expungement were mostly about the
lack of breadth within the laws: who could apply and which types
of information was eligible. Now, sealing official data, and lots of
it, is possible, should the stars align. As others have noted, the present problem is different: at stake is expungement’s efficacy as a
remedy within a larger, digitized, surveillance-based economy.88
The limits of expungement are thus related to lackluster enforcement regimes with little capacity for dealing with the trafficking of
data held by private actors after it has been formally ordered expunged in the official system. Technological realities exacerbate
burden on petitioners for felony convictions); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.073(4)(a) (LexisNexis 2021).
85. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4374(f) (2021).
86. D.C. CODE § 16-803(h)(2)(A)–(C) (2022); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-3A-5(C)
(2020); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-1415(b) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 609A.03, subdiv. 5(c) (2021);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-706(1)(g) (2022); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2630/5.2(d)(7) (2021). But
see NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.2445(1) (2017) (establishing a “rebuttable presumption that . . .
records should be sealed if the applicant satisfies all statutory requirements for the sealing
of the records”).
87. While J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr have shown that plenty of expungement petitions
are granted, judicial discretion remains. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 67, at 2493–501.
88. See Lageson, supra note 4; Haber, supra note 12, at 348–49.
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this problem, resulting in a real-life game of whack-a-mole for the
petitioner hoping to realize the promise of an achieved expungement. Drawing on the work of other scholars, this section highlights these challenges, before transitioning to potential solutions
offered by other legal regimes in the form of the right to be forgotten.
The reluctance of legislatures to regulate the continued publication and usage of information otherwise ordered expunged undermines the long-term efficacy of the remedy. The federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”)89 is grossly insufficient to combat this
problem. Private data brokers can dispute whether they are consumer reporting agencies under the law, the accuracy requirements are vague, and the statute does not specifically proscribe the
disclosure and sharing of already expunged records.90
State regulation in the same vein is piecemeal. Some states—
like Connecticut—have laws that require constant updating of records by data brokers.91 California law requires consumer reporting
agencies not to report certain types of charges,92 and Indiana requires redactions in other official documents that have the person’s
name.93 But overall, the FCRA and state laws do not provide much
protection. Private litigation does not have a track record of success
under the statutes and defamation actions are also viewed skeptically by courts.94
The technological realities of the real world also undermine official expungement: information-sharing is the fuel on which most
of the world runs, and, as Eldar Haber has forcefully argued, the
world is no longer kinetic.95 To make that more concrete, whereas
the same problem existed before the internet—the dissemination
of information otherwise expunged by private actors after the expungement—it was a lot more difficult given that the erasure of
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
90. Haber, supra note 12, at 357 (citing Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-offender Status and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100
VA. L. REV. 893, 918 (2014)).
91. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142e (2022).
92. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(a) (Deering 2022).
93. Doris Del Tosto Brogan, Expungement, Defamation, and False Light: Is What Happened Before What Really Happened or Is There a Chance for a Second Act in America?, 49
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 20 (2017).
94. See, e.g., G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 314–16 (N.J. 2011); Nilson v. Layton City, 45
F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995).
95. Haber, supra note 12, at 348 (noting how the biggest threat to expungement is that
rehabilitation “worked well in the kinetic world”).
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the official data marked a clear line in time that prevented continued, mass accumulation of the data.96 The speed of communication
was also slower. Verbal gossip traveled, but not at the same pace,
and such gossip did not automatically equal publication, forever.
In other words, once the governmental institution erased or sealed
the data, permanently obtaining it was nearly impossible, not to
mention accessing it in the first place. Even if media organizations
retained it in their archives, those archives were not digitized and
easily searchable. As Haber puts it, “[t]he digital era changed this
form of practical obscurity.”97 In today’s world, availability anywhere enables access almost anytime, and also amounts to some
form of perpetual publication.
How so? First, information storage and sharing is much easier,
and at this point an industry norm.98 This is reflected in governmental sharing of criminal record history information, which has
become almost entirely digitized and available on the internet.99
States have central repositories of information that are largely
available to the public and Congress mandated the same for federal
entities.100 A private market later followed, serving the landlords,
employers, and other institutions looking for background information.101 Thus, official data shared by governments became eternally held private data beyond the reach of regulators.102
This new form of private business is emblematic of a broader
economic movement that prioritizes accumulating information
about human experience in order to ultimately monetize it. Government sharing of docket sheets with charges, demographic information, and other details is highly valuable information. Information accumulation is capital acquisition and criminal records
history information is a particularly exciting type of information
that many deem reasonable to their everyday associational

96. As Haber writes, “it was practically impossible” to obtain the data because the governmental entities “no longer maintained them.” Id. at 348–49.
97. Id. at 349.
98. Id.
99. Lageson, supra note 4.
100. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 37, at 185.
101. Haber, supra note 12, at 351–52 (“More generally, there was a great demand for
companies that could provide a service for end-users to obtain criminal history records that
could potentially be more accurate and nationwide in scope.”); see also JACOBS, supra note
6, at 70–73 (discussing the rise of private data brokers trafficking in background information).
102. Haber, supra note 12, at 352.
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decisions.103 The internet is the vehicle by which this economic activity moves, chases all material, and ultimately thrives.104 Thus,
the problems identified in Haber’s excellent Article combine with
a larger economic culture that has embraced the commodification
of human experience and packaged it to consumers as the right to
know and share information.105
This broader cultural and economic reality is hard to dispute.
Shoshana Zuboff, in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, has exposed this forcefully, demonstrating how the largest tech and databased corporations aim to acquire all data about human experience.106 These activities invade spaces and the decisional capabilities once thought to be immune from private actors, resulting in a
new normal that undermines rigid legal concepts like privacy and
consent.107 After all, Google’s stated mission—“to organize the
world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful”108—runs directly counter to the promise of expungement and
fortifies its limits. As Zuboff notes, this means that information
that would “normally age and be forgotten now remains forever
young, highlighted in the foreground of each person’s digital identity.”109 When memories dictate the present, it is nearly impossible
to move on from one’s past. Attempting to escape from this labyrinth of informational connections and expectations is nearly impossible on an individual level, and expungement law is just one
legal regime struggling to keep pace.
As will be discussed below, these limits are likely to remain the
status quo given several norms in American law. Ultimately, they
doom proposals like the right to be forgotten, which can be viewed
as subversive to the new norms, like information sharing and data
accumulation, and old norms, like transparency in criminal justice.

103. Id. at 362 (noting the demand for criminal histories, resulting in explosive growth
in the market).
104. ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 21 (describing the totalizing, accumulative logic of surveillance capitalism).
105. Id. at 19.
106. Id. at 21.
107. Id. at 14.
108. Our Approach to Search, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search/howsearch
works/mission/#:~:text=Maximize%20access%20to%20information,a%20wide%20variety%
20of%20sources [https://perma.cc/AD5Y-M6KB].
109. ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 59.
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II. THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
Given the problem mentioned in section I.C., some have conceived a right to be forgotten to ensure the actual efficacy of expungement or remedies like it. This Part details this concept by
first discussing its origin in Continental Europe. It then analyzes
its viability in the United States to date given existing theories of
privacy and reputation, as well as existing case law relating to the
accessibility of public information and private tort actions involving harms to privacy and reputation. It concludes by discussing a
recent phenomenon: the efforts of private actors, like newspapers,
to step into the breach when it comes to the persistence of such
harmful information. In the end, the norms and existing doctrines
in American law relating to privacy, reputation, and transparency
limit the viability of the RTBF as a solution to the problem of private dissemination and use of already expunged information.
A. Continental Origin: Privacy and Reputation
The development of the RTBF in European countries can be
traced to the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) and
its statement in article 8 that “[e]veryone has the right to respect
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”110
This overarching statement is qualified by the following:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.111

In 1995, the European Data Protection Directive (“DPD”) laid out
principles for how information relating to data subjects can be processed legally.112 The DPD formed the “core of the European dataprotection framework,” directing European countries to design
ways to protect data rights of their citizens.113 Notably, article 12
of the DPD gives individuals the right to ask to have personal data

110. European Convention on Human Rights, Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
111. Id.
112. Andrés Guadamuz, Developing a Right to be Forgotten, in EU INTERNET LAW:
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 61 (Eleni Synodinou et al. eds., 2017).
113. MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 28 (2016).
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deleted once the data is “no longer necessary.”114 The DPD also
gave individuals the right to notice, access, correction, and deletion
of their personal information.115 In 2016, the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) updated the DPD, outlining the “right to
be forgotten,” leading to different enforcement actions in different
countries.
In Germany, the RTBF grew from the concept of informational
self-determination. As Gerrit Hornung and Christoph Schnabel argued, this means “[t]he individual is shielded from interferences in
personal matters, thus creating a sphere in which he or she can
feel safe from any interference.”116 As will be discussed below, Daniel Solove has shown how this concept differs radically from common notions of privacy in United States law.117 Most pointedly, informational self-determination enables individuals to control and
decide how they want to be presented to third parties and the public, including which personal information is made available, and to
whom.118 Germany has coupled this concept with a robust notion
of data protection designed to foster democratic participation.
Thus, the public interest in privacy and reputational protection is
twofold, premised on self-determination and the ability to participate civically.
While this default posture is a strong counterweight to notions
of free expression, German courts, prior to the GDPR, struggled
with how to apply it to concrete cases. For example, in the case of
Princess Caroline of Monaco v. The Judgments of the Lower Courts,
the court held that photographs obtained while the Princess was
in a public place could not be controlled by the Princess, but that
images obtained while she was in private could be controlled if the
individual could reasonably believe he or she had not been exposed
to the public when the images were taken.119 Princess Caroline
114. Nicolae Dragoş Costescu, Google Spain Decision—An Analysis of the Right to be
Forgotten—A Regression from Past Interpretations of ECJ, in ANALELE UNIVERSITĂŢII DIN
BUCUREŞTI: SERIA DREPT [ANNALS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST: THE LAW SERIES]
654 (C.H. Beck ed., 2016).
115. McKay Cunningham, Free Expression, Privacy, and Diminishing Sovereignty in the
Information Age: The Internationalization of Censorship, 69 ARK. L. REV. 71, 80–81 (2016).
116. Gerrit Hornung & Christoph Schnabel, Data Protection in Germany I: The Population Census Decision and the Right to Informational Self-Determination, 25 COMPUT. L. &
SEC. REV. 84, 86 (2009).
117. See infra notes 162, 208–12, 310 and accompanying text.
118. JONES, supra note 113, at 32.
119. BVerfGE [The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany], 1 BvR 653/96, ¶ 80, Dec.
15, 1999, https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/ 1999/
12/rs19991215_1bvr065396en.html [https://perma.cc/5DLS-GJZT].
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appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, which overturned the Germany court, citing article 8 of the DPD. The ECHR
held that privacy guarantees undergird the ability of individuals
to develop their own personalities and that sometimes even public
interactions are considered “private” by the law.120 While the private lives of politicians might be construed as matters of public interest, the private lives of private figures, even if those activities
are visible in a technical sense to the public, are protected by article 8.121
The ECHR decided a case involving public criminal record history information in 2012. In M.M. v. United Kingdom,122 the petitioner was arrested in Northern Ireland in 2000 after kidnapping
her baby grandson for a day in an attempt to prevent the child’s
mother from going to Australia after the mother and father’s relationship had ended.123 The child was never hurt; at the time, the
grandmother was given what is called a “caution for child abduction” and told it would expire in five years.124 Later, she learned a
policy change had led to its extension for her life.125 After being
offered a job in the mid-2000s, a background check revealed the
caution.126 She brought suit in the ECHR, claiming that the extension of the caution for life, and recordkeeping that permitted its
discovery, violated article 8.127 The ECHR agreed, holding that the
storing of the information relating to her “private” life and the release of such information fell under article 8.128 Absent a clear and
detailed statutory regulation governing the length of time the information would be stored, and how it would be stored, article 8
was violated. Notably, the ECHR considered the criminal record
part of the petitioner’s private life even though it involved a criminal case.129

120. Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 1), App. No. 59320/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, ¶ 50 (Sept.
9, 2004), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/tur#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-61853%22]} [https://perm
a.cc/GB22-56VY].
121. Id. at ¶ 64.
122. M.M. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24029/07, ¶ 6 (Apr. 29. 2013), https://hu
doc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-114517%22]} [https://perma.cc/X2LZ-X62H].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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France has a long history of data protection laws, updating them
in 2004 to meet then-existing EU standards.130 In 2010, several
online platforms, but not including Google and Facebook, signed a
charter with the French government creating a “right of oblivion.”131 The charter enabled internet users to complain about indexing in search engines.132 Google became implicated in 2012 in a
case involving a woman who had been employed in the pornography industry.133 The court ordered Google.com and Google.fr to delete all links to the woman’s past because it harmed her right to be
forgotten.134 The woman had contacted a specific website to no
avail, and her requests to Google to prevent access to the website
were met with a response that she should contact the website.135
The French tribunal relied on a French data protection law to hold
that Google was interfering with the woman’s right to be forgotten.136
Spain is a particularly noteworthy case study when it comes to
the public’s ability to access criminal case information. While the
Spanish Constitution guarantees public access to criminal trials,
verdicts are usually sent only to the defendant in writing.137 If the
opinion is published, the government redacts the name of the defendants and case files are not freely available to the public.138 This
default legal position has extensive history, finding support in
Spanish Supreme Court cases that have held that while courts are
open to the public, the judgments from those courts are not part of
public record, and access is limited to parties with concrete
130.
131.

JONES, supra note 113, at 28, 37.
BUREAU EUROPÉEN DES UNIONS DE CONSOMMATEURS [EUROPEAN CONSUMERS’
ORGANIZATION], A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH ON PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION: EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S COMMUNICATION 9 (2011), https://www.be
uc.eu/publications/2011-00062-01-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRK9-QCAL].
132. Laurent Checola, “Right to be Forgotten” on the Internet: A Charter Signed Without
Google or Facebook, LE MONDE (Oct. 13, 2010, 3:42 PM), https://www.lemonde.fr/technologi
es/article/2010/10/13/droit-a-l-oubli-sur-internet-une-charte-signee-sans-google-ni-facebook
_1425667_651865.html [https://perma.cc/DRK9-QCAL].
133. Laura Ligouri & Frederica De Santis, Could ISPs be Forced to Take Action to Guarantee Individual’s “Right to be Forgotten”? From the “Right to be Let Alone” to Control Over
Personal Data, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 3, 2012), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
2b89a15f-4606-4aff-ac63-4506d989d3fb [https://perma.cc/F8LK-CY2G].
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. James B. Jacobs & Elena Larrauri, American Criminal Record Exceptionalism (I):
A Spanish Comparison, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE RES. CTR. (Dec. 30, 2014), https://ccres
ourcecenter.org/2014/12/30/american-criminal-record-exceptionalism-spanish-comparison
[https://perma.cc/M6WW-H37M].
138. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 164.
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connections to the case.139 This position is truly foreign to the
American conception of criminal records data.
Three cases between 1999 and 2010 involving the publicizing of
past criminal activity illustrate the point. In 1999, the Sentencia
Tribunal Constitutional (the Constitutional Court) held that criminal convictions are “personal information” and cannot be disclosed
to anyone, even another governmental agency, because “the constitutional right to privacy guarantees anonymity, a right not to be
known, so that the community is not aware of who we are or what
we do.”140 In 2008, the Tribunal Supremo held that information
about accusations and convictions of named individuals is personal
data.141 Additionally, the Personal Data Protection Law (“PDPL”)
made it illegal to post such information on a website, and for court
judgments to be publicly accessible, and held that only governmental agencies can maintain databases of criminal convictions.142 Finally, in 2010, the Sentencia de la Audencia Nacional held that a
city’s decision to post information about a fired police officer’s sexual assault conviction on the city’s website violated the officer’s privacy rights.143
These developments contributed to the European Union’s ultimate creation of the General Data Protection Regulation
(“GDPR”), which came into effect in 2018 and governs “how personal data must be collected, processed, and erased.”144 The RTBF
originated in the early 2010s under the umbrella of the right to
access one’s personal data.145 It now explicitly exists within the
GDPR, specifically in article 17, which reads: “The data subject
shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of
personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the
controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without

139. See id. at 163–68.
140. S.T.C., July 22, 1999 (B.O.E., No. 204) (Spain), https://www.poderjudicial.es/search
/TS/openDocument/c47a6504f7cbe15f/19960102 [https://perma.cc/JS3N-66G3]; JACOBS, supra note 6, at 165.
141. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 166.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Everything You Need to Know About the “Right to be Forgotten,” GDPR.EU, https://
gdpr.eu/right-to-be-forgotten [https://perma.cc/UWQ6-R4S4].
145. Council Directive 95/46/EC, art. 10, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L
281/31).
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undue delay.”146 This right of data subjects follows the right to access one’s personal information now located in article 15.147
By its terms, the RTBF is not absolute and only applies in specific circumstances. The right to erasure includes when the data is
no longer necessary for the purpose an organization originally collected it for, the subject has withdrawn consent to usage of the
data, the subject objects to its usage for marketing purposes, there
is no “legitimate interest” that overrides the subject’s objection to
the usage of the data, an organization has processed the information unlawfully, and an organization must erase the data due
to a legal ruling or obligation.148 But organizational rights to keep
the data or use it trump individual rights when “[t]he data is being
used to exercise the right of freedom of expression and information,” is “being used to comply with a legal ruling or obligation,”
relates to a task in the public interest or the organization’s official
authority, relates to public health purposes, or relates to a host of
scientific or medical purposes.149 These conflicting interests necessarily lead to confusion about the strength of the RTBF, not to mention the ability to enforce it.
Scholarly work to date suggests that although the RTBF and the
broader GDPR have become normalized in European law, their implementation remains a matter of great dispute.150 The primary
difficulty stems from the right’s own framework, which encourages
notice by the individual and a response by the entity to delist or
not, which provides ample discretion for online platforms to make
determinations contrary to the interests of the individual subject.151 Google itself has found “two dominant intents” for delisting
requests: half of all requests involved removal of personal history
and legal history.152

146. Council Regulation, 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1).
147. Id. at art. 15.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See generally Bruno Zeller, Leon Trakman, Robert Walters & Sinta Dewl Rosadi,
The Right to be Forgotten—the EU and Asia Pacific Experience (Australia, Indonesia, Japan
and Singapore), 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 23 (2019) (“The right to be forgotten has quickly
become an important concept of data protection law. . . . However, the acceptance and implementation of this right . . . varies.”).
151. Theo Bertram et. al, Five Years of the Right to be Forgotten, CCS ’19: PROC. 2019
ACM SIGSAC CONF. ON COMPUT. & COMMC’NS SEC. 959, 959–60 (2019), https://doi.org
/10.1145/3319535.3354208 [https://perma.cc/ R92P-Z73H].
152. Id. at 959.
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In the wake of the GDPR, Google set up an elaborate process to
handle these requests, both procedurally and substantively. Requests are reviewed manually, and according to Google, the “reviewers consider four criteria that weigh public interest versus the
requester’s personal privacy”:
1. The validity of the request;
2. The identity of the requester, including whether the person
is a public figure;
3. The content referenced in the specific URL; and
4. The source of the information (e.g., government or private).153
Most recently, implementation came to a head in a case involving Google and France’s data authority, the Commission Nationale
de l’Informatique et des Libertes (“CNIL”).154 Google had objected
to the French authority’s interpretation of the scope of the GDPR,
arguing CNIL could not enjoin Google to delist information globally.155 Since 2014, Google has received over a million requests under the GDPR.156 In the case, the European Court of Justice held
that Google did not have to apply the right globally, effectively
meaning that removal of information only needed to occur for
search results happening within Europe, and only after an appropriate request.157 This means that Google did not have to de-reference a subject “on all [of] the versions of its search engine.”158 Essentially, CNIL lacked authority to enforce the GDPR beyond the
EU.
In a second, less well-known case, the EU high court essentially
mandated a “notice-and-delist regime” for certain kinds of “sensitive” information, such as criminal justice records.159 But the court
153. Theo Bertram et al., Three Years of the Right to be Forgotten 2–3 (unpublished manuscript), https://d110erj175o600.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/google.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/HLS5-8K6Q].
154. Leo Kelion, Google Wins Landmark Right to be Forgotten Case, BBC (Sept. 24,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49808208 [https://perma.cc/DZ6F-ASS4].
155. Id.
156. Requests to Delist Content Under European Privacy Law, GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY
REP., https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=en_GB [https://perma.
cc/U2GJ-DEDB].
157. Kelion, supra note 154.
158. Id.
159. Andrew Keane Woods, Three Things to Remember from Europe’s ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Decisions, LAWFARE (Oct. 1, 2019, 10:11 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-
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also acknowledged the difficulty in operationalizing such a regime,
and effectively punted to national bodies to regulate a platform like
Google as it attempts to do so.160 In other words, the court noted
the difficulties with content moderation and did not appear overly
optimistic that this problem has a one-size-fits all approach.
Despite the difficulties in implementation, the RTBF remains
part of European law. It is explicitly written into the GDPR and
recognizes individual privacy rights to control data that appears
online. Some credit this normalization with the civil law tradition
in European countries,161 although there has been movement in
the United Kingdom, despite its common-law history, in favor of
the RTBF.162 The current legal reality is a set of standards and
interests for consideration by courts, with diverse results, but consistent recognition of the right as legitimate and worthy of balancing. Whether the right is to be forgotten or to simply request as
much is being worked out in real time. As one set of scholars puts
it, the right is an “evolving concept . . . [but w]hat is certain is the
fact that EU citizens are afforded a level of right to request from
an entity that their personal data be deleted or removed from the
internet.”163 That is a degree of autonomy unlikely to materialize
in American law anytime soon given confusion about what privacy
is and the entrenchment of transparency as a legal norm when it
comes to the criminal justice system.
B. The Limits of American Law
American law has not developed in the same direction. Skepticism of the RTBF stems from the bundling of several entrenched
legal concepts and their relation to one another. A general commitment to transparency and free speech rivals the tenuous concepts
of privacy and reputation that solidified the right in Europe, with
a heavy presumption for the former basically treasured in American law. Although the common law restricted access to public records for limited purposes, courts have generally permitted access
to judicial records, and open records statutes have proliferated
things-remember-europes-right-be-forgotten-decisions [https://perma.cc/9Z8S-4JL3].
160. Id.
161. Zeller et al., supra note 150, at 30.
162. See NT1 & NT2 v. Google, LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB), https://www.judiciary.
uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/nt1-Nnt2-v-google-2018-Eewhc-799-QB.pdf [https://perma.
cc/KGZ9-6D3M]; Róisín A. Costello, The Right to be Forgotten in Cases Involving Criminal
Convictions, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 268 (2018) (discussing NT1 v. Google).
163. Zeller et al., supra note 150, at 32.
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over the past century.164 Thus, transparency is essentially legally
enshrined. As the Supreme Court of the United States stated in
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the right to access public
records rests on “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the
workings of public agencies . . . and in a newspaper publisher’s intention to publish information concerning the operation of government.”165 Thus, access norms and free speech breed skepticism of a
right to delete unflattering information.166 Further, privacy is an
ever developing concept in need of a definition, with a tortured history in various parts of American law. And the law of reputation is
equally stilted when it comes to private access and use of public
records. This section details these limitations against the broader
backdrop that prefers transparency in public records.
1. Criminal Justice, Transparency, and First Amendment Norms
Access to public criminal records implicates the First Amendment because an individual’s ability to access government records
has been recognized as constitutionally protected.167 Second, the
press’s ability to obtain and publish information relating to the actions of government has been upheld.168 From there, the ball can
pass through an endless chain of private hands. A right of access
to public records is essentially the default position recognized in
law, especially in the criminal context. Allowing access began with
the common law, with deference to the discretion of lower court
judges when privacy interests were at stake.169 Public records outside of litigation were more likely to receive protection than documents recording what was happening in court.170

164. Solove, supra note 15, at 1157 (citing Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis
of Public Records Statutes, 28 URB. LAW. 65, 69–70 (1996); and then citing Jason Lawrence
Cagle, Note, Protecting Privacy on the Front Page: Why Restrictions on Commercial Use of
Law Enforcement Records Violate the First Amendment, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1422 & n.2
(1999)).
165. 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
166. Rosen, supra note 17, at 88–92.
167. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see also Solove, supra
note 15, at 1194 (discussing Richmond Newspapers).
168. See Solove, supra note 15, at 1199.
169. Id. at 1155.
170. Id. at 1155 (“The right of access to court records differs from the right to access other
public records.”). Solove notes how the Supreme Court in Nixon recognized the common law
right of access, subject to a few limitations. Id. at 1155.
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The concept of open access is enshrined in open records laws.
The Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)171 is the most wellknown statute responding to complaints that agencies were denying access to public records.172 Interestingly, FOIA only applies to
records maintained by executive agencies rather than legislative
or judicial records.173 Every state also has a mini-FOIA.174 These
laws relaxed the common law requirement that the party requesting information have an interest in the information, instead opting
for at-will requests. This essentially allows access to executivelyheld information for any reason.175 Getting public information
“when I want it” is the norm.
That said, FOIA and laws like it contain exemptions that allow
the government to withhold information.176 Some of these exceptions make particular reference to information many would consider private, like health records.177 However, FOIA does not require notice to individuals who have records within an otherwise
existing FOIA request.178 State open records laws, as Solove notes,
contain a patchwork of privacy protections, although courts have
muddled their meaning.179 While FOIA was enacted prior to the
digital revolution, in the mid-1990s Congress passed the Electronic
Freedom of Information Amendments (“E-FOIA”),180 which essentially extended FOIA enabled access to electronic public records.181
Transparency is the norm in the criminal justice system and
with respect to court proceedings because the administration of the
criminal justice system on a macro and micro level is considered a
public matter. This is a crucial distinction that marks a significant
difference from law in countries like Spain. As Solove points out:
There are at least four general functions of transparency: (1) to shed
sunshine on governmental activities and proceedings; (2) to find out
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
172. Solove, supra note 15, at 1158 (citing S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965)).
173. § 552(f).
174. Nowadzky, supra note 164, at 65–66.
175. U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 771 (1989)
(recognizing FOIA as providing access rights to the general public that mirror the rights of
those asserting a particular interest in particular documents).
176. § 552(b).
177. Id. § 552(b)(6).
178. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 593–94 (1995).
179. Solove, supra note 15, at 1160.
180. Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Electronic FOIA, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (2020), https://efoia.
bis.doc.gov [https://perma.cc/Q544-GQBC].
181. § 552(a)(2) (2000); Solove, supra note 15, at 1164.
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information about public officials and candidates for public office; (3)
to facilitate certain social transactions, such as selling property or initiating lawsuits; and (4) to find out information about other individuals for a variety of purposes.182

Public criminal records relate to at least three of these. First,
public criminal records shed light on what happened in criminal
proceedings: who was arrested and possibly convicted, the disposition of the charges, the actors involved in determinations, and the
particular types of hearings that happened within an entire case.
In theory, this information could allow for accountability, but
mostly in a downstream way. Courts have acknowledged this
themselves, noting how public arrest records provide valuable
“protection of the public against secret arrests” and improper police
tactics,183 and help to preserve “the integrity of the law enforcement and judicial processes”184 Access to court records allows the
public to serve as a watchdog to the integrity of the judicial function.185 And data driven criminal justice research and reform efforts benefit from this norm.
The third function of transparency—the facilitating of social
transactions—also relates to public criminal records. These records may affect whether public benefits or private transactions can
occur under the law. Finally, public criminal records serve the
fourth function of transparency—permitting individuals to simply
know information that they might find useful down the road for
various purposes. This, in essence, is the crossroads when it comes
to the limits of expungement law. Expungement is an act against
transparency for this function; as such, it is, by definition, in tension with transparency and privacy. After all, the thirst for transparency underwrites the desire to access records that might inform
whether to hire an employee, babysitter, or bus driver.186
These values suggest why the Supreme Court has held that the
right of access extends to governmental proceedings and why
courts have extended these precedents to include access to court
records. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, a Court plurality held that the First Amendment provides the public with a right
to access criminal trials, although no single rationale garnered a
182. Solove, supra note 15, at 1173.
183. United States v. Ross, 259 F. Supp. 388, 390 (D.D.C. 1966).
184. United States v. Hickey, 767 F.2d 705, 708 (10th Cir. 1985).
185. Solove, supra note 15, at 1174.
186. Id. at 1176 (acknowledging that while these purposes might be questionable, they
are real and valued by many).
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majority for the seven justices who agreed with the result.187 However, a few years later, the Court did articulate a test to determine
the right to access a criminal proceeding. In Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, the Court stated the first inquiry is whether the
proceeding has “historically . . . been open to the press and general
public.”188 Next, the question is whether access “plays a particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and
the government as a whole.”189 The Court was clear with respect to
its baseline position as to accessing criminal trials, stating “public
access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and
serve as a check upon the judicial process—an essential component
in our structure of self-government.”190 With that said, this right
was not absolute.191 These initial Supreme Court cases were extended to other aspects of criminal proceedings: jury selection and
certain pretrial contexts.192 There is disagreement about whether
these precedents logically extend to accessing court records. Some
courts have extended their logic to allow access to documents and
records,193 while others draw the line at records.194
Altogether, American practices with respect to accessing criminal records are, as James Jacobs and others have said, “a powerful
example of . . . exceptionalism.”195 This is a result, to some degree,
of liberal democratic premises that conflict.196 When compared to
European countries, who have similar premises supporting their
187. 448 U.S. 555, 575–78 (1980).
188. 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982).
189. Id. at 605–06.
190. Id. at 606.
191. Id. at 607 (referring to compelling interests as potentially overriding the right).
192. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (applying Richmond Newspapers to jury selection); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 10
(1986) (same); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 557 (3d. Cir. 1982) (applying Richmond Newspapers to pretrial hearings); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363–64 (5th
Cir. 1983) (applying Richmond Newspapers to bail reduction hearings).
193. Solove, supra note 15, at 1203 (citing United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 811
(10th Cir. 1997)); Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Access means
more than the ability to attend open court proceedings; it also encompasses the right of the
public to inspect and to copy judicial records.”); Assoc. Press v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143,
1145 (4th Cir. 1984) (“There is no reason to distinguish between pretrial proceedings and
the documents filed in regard to them.”).
194. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994)
(“[T]here is no general First Amendment right in the public to access criminal justice records.”).
195. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 159.
196. Amanda Conley, Anupam Datta, Helen Nissenbaum & Divya Sharma, Sustaining
Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary
Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 774 (2012) (referencing “one current” demanding openness, and
“the other” demanding privacy).
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law, the right of free speech protections in the United States are
stronger.197 The result is a default posture that is stacked against
definitions of privacy.
For example, while the federal FOIA and state analogues attempt to balance transparency and privacy, the statute favors the
former. The Supreme Court considered whether the privacy exception in FOIA offered protection for criminal information compiled
in an investigation and held by prosecutors in U.S. Department of
Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.198 At first
glance, the Supreme Court’s decision that upheld the Department
of Justice’s ability to cite privacy as a reason not to disclose seems
to cut against transparency. But the decision actually created a
balancing framework, and mostly for individuals involved in the
case who were not full-fledged suspects.199
Furthermore, the reach of that precedent to run-of-the-mill court
records seems like a stretch. Criminal case records are available in
courthouses across the country and downloadable from the internet. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld access rights for
the public and the media, holding that “the circumstances under
which the press and public can be barred from a criminal trial are
limited; the State’s justification in denying access must be a
weighty one.”200 As Jacobs said, this means “[d]isclosing an expunged conviction could not be prohibited or punished as long as
the information was lawfully obtained.”201
This preference for transparency and deference to First Amendment norms also exists in the commercial context, but at least one
court was willing to suggest the protections are not as strong.202
FCRA, which prohibits reporting certain types of criminal records
after a certain amount of time, was considered constitutional by a
federal district court before the case was settled in 2014. That left
the constitutional issue for another day, however, and still would
not affect the third-party dissemination problem. Once the

197. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 171 (referencing how Spanish Constitution’s protections
for free speech are much weaker than the First Amendment).
198. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
199. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 174.
200. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
201. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 177.
202. King v. Gen. Info. Servs., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
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information is in the hands of the press or a publisher, the First
Amendment’s free speech guarantee seems to provide strong protection.203
That final point also seems to extend to the types of entities that
enable most of the access to such information, such as Google.
Google and other firms have resisted regulation, citing the First
Amendment rights to expression. Google claims possession of the
information,204 or the indexing of the information, and then tethers
it to First Amendment concepts to fashion its arguments against
erasure. Frank Pasquale has coined this “free speech fundamentalism.”205 Concepts of ownership, property, speech, and expression
are bundled to resist regulation. These arguments exist against a
historical backdrop of deference to web-based companies. For example, § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,206 shields
website owners from liability for user-generated content. As Zuboff
notes, this enables a site like TripAdvisor to have negative hotel
reviews.207 Sharing criminal record history information is just another form of the same activity.
2. The Limits of Privacy Law
Because the First Amendment provides presumptively strong
protection to the majority of the keepers of such information, a
counterweight is necessary to regulate dissemination of the information. The Supreme Court and lower courts have referenced privacy in decisions.208 But the limits of privacy as a theoretical rationale for the RTBF rest in the reality that no singular theory of
privacy seems to exist, and the fact that American law contains
competing paradigms without preference for one or the other. Further, existing statutory privacy protections are treated as the exception to the norm of transparency, and legislation based on
203. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 187 (“[I]f a media organization or private person gets hold
of and publishes personal medical information or grades, that disclosure would be protected
by the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee.”).
204. Zuboff synthesizes these declarative, possessory claims into six overarching principles: (1) human experience is raw material that can be claimed for free; (2) such experience
can be translated; (3) such experiential data can be owned; (4) the right to take and own
confers the right to know; (5) the right to take, own, and know confers the right to use and
decide how to use; and (6) number 5 confers rights to preserve such rights. ZUBOFF, supra
note 2, at 179.
205. Id. at 109.
206. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
207. ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 110.
208. See supra Part II.
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privacy rights has failed to progress in numerous states. And post9/11, mass surveillance for security purposes displaced any robust
sense of privacy, especially on the web.209
a. Limits in Theories of Privacy
The concept of privacy under American law is unlikely to provide
firm footing for something akin to the RTBF. Privacy as a legal
concept is simultaneously lauded as legitimate while critiqued as
incoherent, vague, and underwhelming.210 Daniel Solove has written extensively on the difficulties of understanding privacy and
how scholars and judges have struggled to define it, looking unsuccessfully for the “holy grail” that is the “common denominator” of
privacy.211 Possible definitions have included the right to be let
alone, limiting access to oneself, secrecy and concealment of personal information, the ability to control personal information, personhood, and intimacy.212 Solove contends all of these strive to reduce privacy to a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, and all
of them are subject to being labeled overbroad, vague, or too narrow.213 He proposes a different understanding, opting for a patchwork approach that essentially leads to a taxonomy that illustrates
privacy, but does not define it with clear-cut boundaries.214
Examining each of the proposed definitions indicates how they
are imperfect for grounding the erasure of criminal record information held by private parties. The right to be let alone—first developed by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in The Right to Privacy in the Harvard Law Review215—influenced the development
of numerous privacy related torts.216 But as Solove points out, this
conception suffers from a definitional problem by begging the question. After all, in order to know when someone has the right to be
let alone, knowledge of which areas of life are private is essential.217 But Warren and Brandeis never clarified those parameters.
209. ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 114 (noting how the FTC switched to a concrete harmsbased model for enforcement of privacy violations after 9/11).
210. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1–8 (2008).
211. Id. at 38.
212. Id. at 12–13.
213. Id. at 1–9, 12–13.
214. Id. at 9–11, 43.
215. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
216. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 16 (citing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, MARC ROTENBERG & PAUL
M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 31 (2d ed. 2006)).
217. Id. at 17 (“Understanding privacy as being let alone does not inform us about the
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Further, with respect to criminal record history information, the
antisocial, public conduct that led to the creation of such information in the first place suggests a right to privacy with respect to
the nature of that conduct is unlikely. Even conceiving this right
as the ability to remain secluded218 is problematic, considering the
rationale for the right to be forgotten with respect to arrestees and
ex-offenders is the need for reentry, which is the opposite of the
ability to hide.
Another conception of privacy involves the notion of limited access. Solove traces this idea to E.L. Godkin, who framed it as the
“right of every man to keep his affairs to himself, and to decide for
himself to what extent they shall be the subject of public observation and discussion.”219 Contemporary scholars who share this conception refer to it as the ability to limit access to one’s personal
affairs.220 Basically, it involves the ability to exclude, preserving
for oneself a sphere of activity, thoughts, and knowledge for which
permission is required to access. But Solove points out how this
understanding suffers from the same problem as the right to be let
alone—it does not have a uniform understanding of which areas of
life are worthy of limited access.221 In short, knowing what is private seems to be an antecedent question to knowing when access
should be limited.
Solove’s third concept of privacy relates to secrecy and concealment, and as then-Judge Richard Posner put it, involves when information that one desires to be concealed is shared without that
person’s consent.222 This notion of privacy involves the ability to
contain the facts that one does not wish to have public. It is mostly
about the power to only release certain information about oneself.223 But this conception implies a corollary. As Solove points out,
“the view of privacy as secrecy often leads to the conclusion that
once a fact is publicly divulged—no matter how limited or narrow
the disclosure—it can no longer remain private.”224 This comports
matters in which we should be let alone.”).
218. Id. at 18–19.
219. Id. at 19 (citing E.L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 12 J. SOC. SCI. 69, 80
(1880)).
220. Id. (citing Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35–36
(1967)).
221. Id. at 20 (“Without a notion of what matters are private, limited-access conceptions
do not tell us the substantive matters for which access would implicate privacy.”).
222. Id. at 21 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 272–73 (1981)).
223. POSNER, supra note 222, at 234.
224. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 22.
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with Supreme Court doctrine under the 4th Amendment, like the
test for the threshold of what constitutes a search: whether the
person could reasonably expect privacy in the particular area or
thing to be searched.225 Applied to the criminal records arena, privacy as secrecy seems like a nonstarter given that crime is rarely,
if ever, fully secret, and the proceedings themselves (which form
the basis of the records) are almost always public.
The fourth understanding of privacy involves the ability to control information about oneself.226 Solove references theorists like
Alan Westin, Arthur Miller, and Charles Fried, who essentially
link privacy to one’s ability to control information circulation.227
The Supreme Court has referenced this theory before, stating how
privacy involves the individual’s “control of information concerning
his or her person.”228 Like the limited access understanding above,
the focus is on information. This leads to charges that this conception is too narrow, forgetting about activities many would consider
private.229 More importantly for purposes of the argument presented here, this conception still begs the question: which information is worthy of being controlled. Richard Parker references
any information that can be sensed by others as private.230 Of
course, that is very broad. A second problem also exists, namely
what is meant by “control.” Is ownership the linchpin, such that
property concepts inform privacy? What about one’s labor? Solove
aptly points to how linking control to the “fruits of one’s labor,” in
a Lockean sense, necessarily widens the net of control quite far,
implicating the realities of human nature when it comes to third
party knowledge. Solove writes:
Extending property concepts to personal information, however, has
difficulties. Information can be easily transmitted and, once known by
others, cannot be eradicated from their minds . . . . Personal information is often formed in relationships with others. All parties to that
relationship have some claim to the information.231

The problem with applying this understanding to criminal records
history information held by third parties should be apparent. Some
225. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
226. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 24.
227. Id.
228. U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1989).
229. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 25.
230. Id. (citing Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276,
280 (1974)).
231. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 27.
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of those parties have significant relational connections to the criminal justice system. Victims are part of cases, as are witnesses, and
the media rightfully reports on interactions with the criminal justice system. Put simply, it seems difficult to claim that arrestees
and ex-offenders have an ownership interest in information generated by virtue of the criminal justice process. Solove, anticipating
this, references the case of Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., where
Judge Richard Posner, writing for the 7th Circuit, stated: “[a] person does not have a legally protected right to a reputation based on
the concealment of the truth.”232 In short, shared information
rarely belongs to one person, making the link between privacy and
control impracticable.
Another possible conception involves the idea of personhood, or
the ability to construct one’s unique personality. Solove labels this
theory “dignitarian,” rooted in the idea that individuals have the
ability to choose the course for their lives.233 This theory, of course,
is synergistic with pronouncements by the Supreme Court in major
cases like Griswold v. Connecticut234 and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.235 In the latter, Justice Anthony Kennedy famously defined
liberty as the “right to define one’s own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”236 Privacy is thus necessarily tethered to a sphere of liberty beyond the
reach of the state. The problem with this theory and the maintenance and usage of criminal records is that existing criminal law
presumes that the subject of the records has chosen237 to engage in
the conduct that is represented in the record, and that choice was
in many instances public. Thus, the reduction to liberty is not actually helpful for the person with the record. More pointedly, the
definitional problem referenced above remains, but in another
form. In particular, what constitutes personhood? And what are its
necessary conditions such that an imposition implicates privacy?
What is constitutive of one’s identity? Can one construct identity
by erasing the past? In order to preserve a path for her desired
232. 8 F.3d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993).
233. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 30 (referencing the work of several scholars who nestle
this understanding of privacy in the human dignity, the uniqueness of persons, and their
ability to choose the direction for their lives).
234. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
235. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
236. Id. at 851.
237. Of course, while the law presumes free choice, it is well known that not all instances
of involvement with the criminal system are by choice. For example, the initiation of baseless charges and the improper use of discretion by law enforcement (in for example, stopping
individuals) enmesh individuals in the system.
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future? This theory has varied answers.238 In fairness, some answers would leave room for a right to be forgotten, arguing that the
persistent existence of public criminal records amounts to a sort of
totalitarian surveillance that undermines the ability to act freely
and autonomously in a fashion that contributes to identity.239 Zuboff suggests something similar when discussing the “right to a future tense” being obliterated by behavior control through data mining and sharing.240 But that is only one conception of personhood,
not to mention there are tons of state activities that do just that,
and that we would not consider problematic.241 Thus, this theory,
overall, would struggle to coherently serve as the basis of a right
to be forgotten for the individual who has encountered the criminal
justice system.
In sum, existing theories of privacy are unlikely to fortify legal
structures designed to limit or incentivize private usage and dissemination of information that has been ordered expunged.
b. Limits of Privacy Protections in Existing Law
Despite the default position of open access to public records mentioned above in section II.A, and the amorphous nature of defining
privacy, legislatures have passed laws designed to protect privacy.
These laws arose when fears about national computerized databases entered the political arena.242 Congress passed the Privacy
Act in 1974 as a response.243 The Privacy Act gives individuals the
right to access and correct information held by federal agencies and
restricts the collection abilities of federal agencies, as well as their
ability to disclose information.244 Additionally, the maintenance of
the information must be “relevant and necessary” to accomplish a

238. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 31–32. Solove references the work of Jed Rubenfeld, who
has critiqued this theory at length. See id.; Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 737, 773–82 (1989).
239. Rubenfeld, supra note 238, at 782–94.
240. ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 20.
241. SOLOVE, supra note 210, at 33 (referencing state activities that contribute to the
formation of the identity, and that are often mandatory, which are not considered invasions
of privacy).
242. Solove, supra note 15, at 1164 (citing MYRON BRENTON, THE PRIVACY INVADERS 14
(1964); then citing ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967); and then citing Kenneth
L. Karst, “The Files”: Legal Controls Over the Accuracy and Accessibility of Stored Personal
Data, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 342, 359–63 (1966)).
243. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
244. Id.
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purpose of the agency.245 Despite these protections, scholars have
criticized the effect of the Privacy Act’s provisions as relatively minor, failing to inhibit agency use246 of some information, like Social
Security Numbers.247 Most importantly for purposes of this Article,
the Privacy Act does not apply to state or local agencies, or to court
records,248 and leaves little room for remedies in the wake of violations.249
As mentioned above, 9/11 also altered the environment for crafting privacy protections in law, especially as it relates to information, such as criminal history, that might inform security efforts.250 After 9/11, the federal government and corporations like
Google began a de facto public and private partnership that operationalizes the desire to speedily obtain information relevant to national security interests.251 Prior to 9/11, Congress was beginning
to regulate activities on the internet.252 After 9/11, agencies like
the National Security Agency were all ears when it came to learning about Google’s information apparatus. Intelligence and mass
data expenditures spiked after the terrorist attacks.253 As Zuboff
notes, in 2004, the United States General Accounting Office
(“GAO”) “surveyed 199 data-mining projects across dozens of federal agencies and more than 120 programs developed to collect and
analyze personal data to predict individual behavior.”254 Google
search technology was being used to outfit federal agencies around
the same time.255
Finally, private litigation actions have largely been unsuccessful
when using privacy law as a sword. Cases involving allegations of
privacy violations after otherwise expunged information was
shared have been unsuccessful. Court decisions suggest that the

245. Id. § 552a(e)(1).
246. The “routine use exemption” in the Privacy Act is largely considered to be a “huge
loophole.” Schwartz, supra note 178, at 585–87 (citing DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING
PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 323 (1989)).
247. Solove, supra note 15, at 1166–67.
248. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(B), 552(f); United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1013 (3d. Cir.
1988); Warth v. Dep’t of Just., 595 F.2d 521, 522–23 (9th Cir. 1979).
249. Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 193, 198–99 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997).
250. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
251. ZUBOFF, supra note 2, at 116.
252. Id. at 113–14.
253. Id. at 116–17.
254. Id. at 116.
255. Id. at 117.
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publication of truthful information does not violate privacy.256 The
Supreme Court, in Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., held
that under federal law, a state expungement does not erase the fact
of the criminal record.257
c. Limits of Privacy Protections in Proposed Legislation
With respect to any formal recognition of the RTBF in the United
States, some states have attempted legislation. The Right to be
Forgotten Act was introduced in February 2017 in New York and
quickly met First Amendment challenges. According to the bill’s
summary, the law would have required search engines, indexers,
publishers, and any other persons or entities, “which make available, on or through the internet or other widely used computerbased network, program or service, information about an individual to remove such information, upon the request of the individual,
within thirty days of such request.”258 Failing to comply would have
resulted in a $250 per day fine.259 The bill has not moved beyond
the governmental operations committee since January 2018.260
Governor Andrew Cuomo, in his 2020 executive budget, also proposed an amendment for New York’s Freedom of Information Law
that would ban the dissemination of mugshots and “booking information” requested by the public unless the release served a “specific law enforcement purpose.”261 The proposal was designed to
combat websites who forced arrestees to pay to remove their photos
even after the arrestees had been exonerated or the charges had
been dropped.262 The New York Civil Liberties Union opposed the
256. Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 562 (Cal. 2004) (“[A]n invasion of
privacy claim based on allegations of harm caused by a media defendant’s publication of
facts obtained from public official records of a criminal proceeding is barred by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372
(10th Cir. 1995) (“[D]isclosed information itself must warrant constitutional protection” and
an expunged criminal record “is not protected by the constitutional right to privacy.”).
257. 460 U.S. 103, 121–22 (1983).
258. A05323 Bill Summary, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY (Jan. 3, 2018), https://assembly.state.ny.
us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=A05323&term=2017&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Text=Y&Commi
ttee%26nbspVotes=Y&Floor%26nbspVotes=Y [https://perma.cc/7EF8-9CEQ]; A05323,
2017–2018 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
259. Allison Grande, NY’s ‘Right to be Forgotten’ Bill Needs Narrower Focus, LAW360
(Mar. 28, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/906491/ny-s-right-to-be-forgot
ten-bill-needs-narrower-focus [https://perma.cc/Q798-W7EK].
260. A05323 Bill Summary, supra note 258.
261. Legislative Memo: “Mugshot” and Booking Information Ban, NYCLU, https://www.
nyclu.org/en/legislation/legislative-memo-mugshot-and-booking-information-ban [https://pe
rma.cc/JFX4-ZUBE]; A02005C, 2019–2020 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
262. Legislative Memo: “Mugshot” and Booking Information Ban, supra note 261.

2022]

COMPLETING EXPUNGEMENT

1207

proposal, arguing that it was overbroad, failed to define “booking
information,” and would allow for police to control too much of the
information disseminated to the public.263 The NYCLU was concerned that the measure restricted public access to information
while allowing the government to disseminate the information as
it saw fit. Nevertheless, Governor Cuomo signed this amendment
on April 12, 2019.264
California is perhaps the leader when it comes to initiatives that
share the premises of the RTBF. California’s “Online Erasure” Law
went into effect on January 1, 2015.265 The law permits minors to
“request and obtain the removal of content or information posted
on the operator’s Internet Web site [or] service.”266 Notably, information posted by a third party is beyond the reach of the law.
Five years later, California’s Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”)
went into effect. This law purports to give residents several rights:
(1) the right to know what a company’s data practices are, including
what information they collect about consumers; (2) the right to optout of the sale of their personal information; (3) the right to access
certain data and have it deleted; and (4) the right to receive full service from companies at an equal price even if they exercise those privacy rights.267

The reach of this law—meaning to which companies it applies—
is the issue, however. Unlike the GDPR, the law applies only to
companies with gross revenue of more than $25 million that sell
data on more than 50,000 consumers a year and earn at least 50%
of its revenue from selling personal information from consumers.268
These conditions do not apply to all background check companies.
More recently, the California Privacy Rights Act of 2020
(“CPRA”) was on the ballot in November 2020 and passed.269 It will
263. Id.
264. A02005 Summary, N.Y. ST. ASSEMBLY (Apr. 12, 2019), https://nyassembly.gov/
leg/?bn=A02005&term=2019 [https://perma.cc/X6UM-K4FW]; A02005C, 2019–2020 State
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
265. S. 568, 2013–2014 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal., 2013), https://leginfo.legislature.
ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB568 [https://perma.cc/8AJ2-2DJE].
266. Id.
267. Dominique-Chantale Alepin, Social Media, Right to Privacy and the California Consumer Privacy Act Competition, 29 CAL. LAWS. ASS’N. J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION
L., 100–01 (2019).
268. Id. at 100–02.
269. Lothar Determann, California Privacy Rights Ballot Initiative: Businesses, Watch
This Space, THE RECORDER (May 22, 2020), https://www.law.com/therecorder/2020/05/
22/california-privacy-rights-ballot-initiative-businesses-watch-this-space [https://perma.cc/
Q2ML-4D67].
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go into effect January 1, 2023.270 Interestingly, the CPRA would
establish a government agency to enforce the law and regulations
to privacy protection passed to date in California.271 This would remove enforcement from the province of the Attorney General. The
CPRA also includes a new right to correction to allow consumers to
correct information businesses collect about them.272 But the CPRA
also heightens the threshold for consumers of a business in order
for the law to apply to that business, meaning the reach of the privacy protections is smaller.273 The full effect of the law is still being
discussed by privacy scholars.274
Other legislatures have contemplated the RTBF but not made
much progress. Iowa’s legislature has considered the Right to be
Forgotten Act.275 This bill allowed individuals to request certain
content be removed from the internet, but the content had to be of
“minimal value.”276 Content with “minimal value” was defined as
“information related to an individual that is inaccurate, irrelevant,
inadequate, or excessive” and included information that is no
longer relevant, particularly in comparison to the harm it is causing an individual.277 A request under the law put the ball in the
information holder’s court, suggesting removal or that the holder
notify the requestor why the information will not be removed. The
bill remains under consideration after being amended in March
2020.278
Washington came close to passing a Privacy Act in 2020.279
While the Act prioritized protecting consumer data rather than a
right to be forgotten, it did allow for error correction by consumers.280 The Hawaii House of Representatives has contemplated an
amendment to the state constitution that would permit individuals
270. Id.; see also Alepin, supra note 267, at 100–01.
271. Determann, supra note 269; Alepin, supra note 267, at 100–01.
272. Determann, supra note 269; Alepin, supra note 267, at 100–01.
273. Determann, supra note 269; Alepin, supra note 267, at 101.
274. Determann, supra note 269; Alepin, supra note 267, at 102.
275. S. 2351, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2020), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legi
slation/BillBook?ga=88&ba=SF%202351 [https://perma.cc/H3BC-3NRR].
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. S. 5376, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019), https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/bienni
um/2019-20/Pdf/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5376-S2.pdf?q=20200720194042 [https://perma.cc/3F
35-4CY2].
280. Mark Harmsworth, Small Business and ‘The Right to be Forgotten’, WASH. POL’Y
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/detail/small-business-andthe-right-to-be-forgotten [https://perma.cc/PKV5-TSMM].
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to request information be deleted from the internet.281 The bill, titled “Proposing an Amendment to the State Constitution Establishing the Right to be Forgotten,” was similar in its wording to the
Iowa bill mentioned above.282 Specifically, it allowed individuals to
request deletion of “information regarding themselves that is published on the Internet when the information is found to be no
longer necessary or is irrelevant for the original purposes for which
the information was collected.”283 The amendment was introduced
in 2018 and little progress has been made.284 New Mexico’s legislature considered the “Right to Be Forgotten Act,” which required
“certain persons that provide public information to remove damaging information upon request.”285 This bill was very similar to New
York’s law and has been tabled indefinitely since February 2019.286
A similar bill in Massachusetts has not made progress since
2016.287
This activity at the state level communicates a push by some
parties in the United States to begin to regulate how data is used
and disseminated. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce suggested
model privacy legislation that would allow for data deletion requests by consumers, but the legislation had exceptions for data
considered free speech.288 At the congressional level, Senator Mark
Warner published a white paper with policy proposals mirroring
measures in the GDPR, including something akin to the RTBF.289
But acceptable norms moving forward remain in flux, and the
RTBF risks being lost within a broader discussion regarding online

281. H.R. 2572, 30th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2020), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sess
ion2020/bills/HB2572_HD1_.HTM [https://perma.cc/R5XW-CXJA].
282. H.R. 2223, 29th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2018), https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sess
ion2018/bills/HB2223_.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R2Z-S3G5].
283. Id.
284. Hurubie Meko, Beyond ‘Clean Slate’: Some Privacy Advocates Argue for ‘a Right to
be Forgotten’, LANCASTER ONLINE (Jan. 21, 2019), https://lancasteronline.com/news/local/
beyond-clean-slate-some-privacy-advocates-argue-for-a-right-to-be-forgotten/article_ba3bd
458-1b4f-11e9-8a01-1b33b204a2e5.html [https://perma.cc/UKD6-7ZJH].
285. H.R. 437, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2019), https://nmlegis.gov/Legislation/Legis
lation?Chamber=H&LegType=B&LegNo=437&year=19 [https://perma.cc/QA4U-HYL7].
286. Id.
287. H.R. 1356, 189th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2015), https://malegislature.gov/
Bills/189/H1356 [https://perma.cc/9ZAG-DMV3].
288. U.S. Chamber Releases Model Privacy Legislation, Urges Congress to Pass a Federal
Privacy Law, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.uschamber.com/technolo
gy/us-chamber-releases-model-privacy-legislation-urges-congress-pass-federal-privacy-law
[https://perma.cc/ZJ4B-PRFW].
289. MARK R. WARNER, POTENTIAL POLICY PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION OF SOCIAL
MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 15 (2018).
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platforms regulating political speech. This is an illustration of how
speech norms continue to dominate the discussion. For example,
both major political parties have conveyed concern regarding the
lack of accountability social media platforms have in the United
States. The administration of President Donald Trump launched
the tech bias reporting tool in May 2019 to combat political censorship.290 President Trump issued an Executive Order in May 2020,
claiming that “[o]nline platforms are engaging in selective censorship that is harming our national discourse.”291 The Center for Democracy and Technology challenged this Order, claiming it violated the First Amendment rights of social media platforms.292
Now there are proposals to amend § 230 of the Communications
Decency Act to require social media companies to obtain certification that they are acting in a politically neutral fashion.293 And
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi has expressed similar concerns
about § 230.294
Unsurprisingly, social media companies have responded by attempting to create content oversight boards that moderate user
content. Facebook outsourced this job to a third party Oversight
Board that reviews content disputes.295 Twitter’s fact-check program began in May 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, and was
designed to combat COVID-19 misinformation.296 This policy of intervention, not fully available to the public, was later used to combat users of Twitter who desired to “manipulat[e] or interfer[e] in
elections or other civic processes.”297 But these efforts have also
been attacked as violating the First Amendment rights of users.298
290. Emily Birnbaum, White House Launches Tool for Reporting Social Media ‘Bias’, THE
HILL (May 15, 2019, 5:45 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/443934-white-houselaunches-tool-for-reporting-social-media-bias [https://perma.cc/BQD5-QRCL].
291. Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020).
292. Makena Kelly, Trump’s Twitter Order Violates the First Amendment, New Lawsuit
Claims, THE VERGE (June 2, 2020, 4:57 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/2/2127851
7/donald-trump-twitter-executive-order-lawsuit-challenge [https://perma.cc/7AYC-QFNX].
293. Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019).
294. Eric Johnson, Nancy Pelosi Says Trump’s Tweets “Cheapened the Presidency”—and
the Media Encourages Him, VOX (Apr. 12, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019
/4/12/18307957/nancy-pelosi-donald-trump-twitter-tweet-cheap-freak-presidency-kara-swi
sher-decode-podcast-interview [https://perma.cc/VL9Y-7RYD].
295. Oversight Board Bylaws, FACEBOOK 5 (Jan. 2022), https://about.fb.com/wp-cont
ent/uploads/2020/01/Bylaws_v6.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7B9-AB77].
296. Yoel Roth & Nick Pickles, Updating Our Approach to Misleading Information,
TWITTER BLOG (May 11, 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2020/updatingour-approach-to-misleading-information.html [https://perma.cc/A7U2-7YGF].
297. Civic Integrity Policy, TWITTER (Oct. 2021), https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/election-integrity-policy [https://perma.cc/3BT8-GXJP].
298. Elizabeth Culliford & Katie Paul, With Fact-Checks, Twitter Takes on a New Kind
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While these issues are beyond the purview of this Article, they are
indicative of the climate in which any proposed RTBF initiative—
national or state—is likely to be perceived. The reality is that the
First Amendment will continue to be used as a sword by those using technology to disseminate (or withhold) information, and that
any law permitting the RTBF will be viewed as anathema to the
First Amendment rights of the party holding the information.
Further, without clarity as to who owns the information and
data, robust rights for individuals are unlikely to follow. This is a
key distinction between the EU and American approach. As Haber
notes, the EU decided to recognize control over some personal information, whereas American law remains ambiguous at best and
frankly deferential to the large technology firms accumulating the
data (and claiming ownership without question) in the first
place.299 This conflict over ownership of the data has downstream
effects on whether something like the right to be forgotten actually
conflicts with free speech and expression principles.300 The
weaponization of data accumulation and dissemination through
reference to speech norms will continue. And that assumes that
arrestees or those who have been convicted could even claim ownership in the data.
In sum, neither theories of privacy, existing privacy law, nor recent legislation relating to the RTBF provide much promise for enforcing expungement against private actors. Entrenched free
speech and expression norms help to ensure expungement is incomplete.
3. The Limits of Reputation Law
Reputation finds little protection in American constitutional,
statutory, or common law. No federal constitutional right to reputation exists. In Paul v. Davis, where a local police chief sent photographs of “active shoplifters” to local businesses for posting, the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not address the tortious, defamatory acts of public
of Task, REUTERS (May 30, 2020, 6:31 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-twitterfactcheck/with-fact-checks-twitter-takes-on-a-new-kind-of-task-idUSKBN2360U0 [https://p
erma.cc/T4DE-YNSG]; Kelly Tyko, Trump Threatens to ‘Strongly Regulate’ or ‘Close Down’
Social Media Platforms After Twitter Fact Check, USA TODAY (May 27, 2020, 9:28 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/05/27/election-fact-check-trump-twitter-mail-inballots/5265036002/ [https://perma.cc/6S7E-JFKY].
299. See Haber, supra note 12, at 370–71.
300. Id. at 371.
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officials. 301 The Sixth Circuit relied on a similar case, Wisconsin v.
Constantineau,302 to hold in favor of a right to reputation in Paul
v. Davis.303 In Constantineau, there was a similar effort to brand
alcoholic patrons of liquor stores with no property interest involved.304 As Jacobs has summarized, “[r]eputational damage resulting from dissemination of arrest information did not violate a
property or liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.”305
Without the protection of the federal Constitution, common law
torts like defamation and invasion of privacy might be relevant to
protect one’s reputation.306 Defamation law is designed to protect
against the spreading of false rumors. There are two types: libel
and slander. Libel involves written or recorded words; slander involves oral communications.307 For the law to provide protection, a
statement must be false and harmful to one’s reputation.308 Further, the speaker must be acting culpably; reasonable mistakes are
a defense.309 Plaintiffs must prove falsity,310 which is of course a
troubling requirement for someone trying to reduce exposure of previously negative information in the case of an expungement. The
resurfacing of the information in the suit itself in order to prove or
disprove the claim chills the use of litigation in the first place.311
More importantly for our purposes, the First Amendment protects
the publication of truthful information, even if it is damaging to
someone’s reputation.312 This includes the private dissemination of
criminal history records.313

301. 424 U.S. 693, 694–95, 712 (1976).
302. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
303. 424 U.S. at 697.
304. 400 U.S. at 434, 437.
305. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 206.
306. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (affirming that states have wide
latitude in defining common law standards for defamatory statements injurious to a private
individual’s reputation).
307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
308. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON
THE INTERNET 118 (2007).
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 580A, 580B (AM. L. INST. 1977).
310. Id.
311. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 545 (1995); SOLOVE, supra note 308, at
120–21 (discussing story of a man who sued for defamation, only to lead to the mass discovery of the information he alleged was untruthful).
312. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975) (holding that accurately
publishing information obtained from public records is not sanctionable).
313. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980).
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In other words, the Supreme Court has constitutionalized the
tort of defamation, subjecting it to scrutiny under the First Amendment. Doris Del Tosto Brogan notes that how successful expungement petitioners are classified could make a difference under existing defamation law: “Are expungees limited purpose public
figures, private figures involved in matters of public interest, or
simply private figures?”314 However, whether classified as public
figures or private figures in matters of public interest does not
seem to make a difference under existing law, as the falsity of the
underlying event would still need to be proved.315 Brogan suggests
that the Supreme Court has never addressed this question directly.316 In Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., the Court
hinted that expungement means no more, for purposes of federal
law, than that the state has mitigated the effects of the record under state law.317
Invasion of privacy torts can also be used to protect reputation.
The most plausible torts in this field are probably related to the
public disclosure of private facts and false light, respectively, but
the types of facts considered protected are limited,318 and the crucial element of false light—proving falsity—is difficult when the
historical event underlying the criminal record was true.319 But because criminal records are not considered private facts, and instead are conceived as public records, this tort is unlikely to provide protection.320
In sum, the question is this: can an individual who has achieved
an expungement bring a cause of action against a private entity or
individual who shares expunged criminal history information? The
answer, under current law, is no. Under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, the Supreme Court protected the publication of criminal
matters of public interest.321 And because public criminal records
314. Brogan, supra note 93, at 32.
315. Id. at 31–32 (noting standards established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
316. Id. at 32–33.
317. 460 U.S. 103, 114–15 (1983).
318. SOLOVE, supra note 308, at 119.
319. See Brogan, supra note 93, at 6.
320. Haber, supra note 12, at 366–67, 376.
321. 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975). Cox Broadcasting was followed by several other cases
holding similarly. See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (holding that
statute prohibiting publication of truthful information identifying juvenile offender violated
First Amendment); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (prohibiting
criminal punishment for news media publication of truthful information); Okla. Publ’g Co.
v. Dist. Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (protecting publication of truthful information about minor
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necessarily relate to the public interest, Cox Broadcasting provides
a defense to the entity publishing information otherwise expunged.
Brogan has entertained the idea of whether a petitioner, having
obtained an expungement, could use defamation or false light torts
as a way to obtain relief.322 But the Second Circuit, in Martin v.
Hearst Corp., appears to have rejected this theory.323 Although the
plaintiff had obtained an expungement under the state statute,
and that statute permitted the plaintiff to deny the record ever existed,324 the information ultimately published was true. The statute could not change that for purposes of tort law, meaning the
plaintiff was powerless to stop the spread of information by private
parties. Even a notion of “constructive falsity,” propped up by the
guarantees of a strong state expungement law, seems doomed to
fail under existing Supreme Court precedent because it would constitutionalize a totally different definition of truth than exists in
current precedent.325 Martin essentially formalized, in case law,
the limits of the expungement law at issue. Thus, existing reputation law does not provide much promise for extending the reach of
expungement law.
C. The Limits of Private Expungement: The Case of Private
Expungement by Newspapers
Newspapers and media organizations have responded to this
problem by moving towards private expungement of their own records over the past few years.326 This practice follows earlier litigation against pernicious sites that shared mugshots of individuals
and only allowed removal for a high price.327 News publications
started to change their policies relating to mugshots and the reporting of crime, opting to publish fewer mugshots and allow

in criminal proceeding).
322. Brogan, supra note 93, at 6.
323. 777 F.3d 546, 552–53 (2d Cir. 2015).
324. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a(e)(3) (2016). Similar laws exist elsewhere. Brogan, supra note 93, at 18–19.
325. See Brogan, supra note 93, at 36–40.
326. This section builds from a more in-depth treatment of mine of the phenomenon of
expungement by newspapers, which originally appeared in the Northwestern Law Review
Online. Murray, supra note 31 (documenting examples of newspaper expungement and considering normative implications of the practice).
327. LAGESON, supra note 12, at 84–85 (describing mugshot litigation).
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individuals to request the removal of negative information in old
stories.328
A few examples illustrate the point. Gatehouse Media, one of the
largest news organizations in the United States, stopped using
slideshows of mugshots.329 The Houston Chronicle has a similar
practice330 and the Orlando Sentinel only publishes mugshots in
major crime stories.331 The New Haven Independent has a policy
against publishing photos or names of arrestees unless a public figure or public emergency is involved or they are able to interview
the person accused.332 In 2018, the Biloxi Sun Herald restricted
coverage of crimes to those presenting an imminent safety concern
and that were part of a trend.333 WCRB-TV in Chattanooga, Tennessee, allows individuals to request removal of names and photos
from old stories associated with minor crimes, such as nonviolent
offenses.334
Since these practices have become public there has been a massive uptick in requests for removal of information from news websites.335 Newspapers process requests after information has been
328. Laura Hazard Owen, Fewer Mugshots, Less Naming and Shaming: How Editors in
Cleveland Are Trying to Build a More Compassionate Newsroom, NIEMANLAB (Oct. 18, 2018,
9:29 AM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/10/fewer-mugshots-less-naming-and-shaminghow-editors-in-cleveland-are-trying-to-build-a-more-compassionate-newsroom [https://per
ma.cc/D23C-8ASQ].
329. Kristen Hare, Gannett Took Mugshot Galleries Off Former GateHouse Sites
Yesterday, POYNTER (June 10, 2020), https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2020/gan
nett-took-mugshot-galleries-off-former-gatehouse-sites-yesterday [https://perma.cc/TTG2Y7RW]; Marc Tracy, Gannett, Now Largest U.S. Newspaper Chain, Targets ‘Inefficiencies’,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/19/business/media/gannettgatehouse-merger.html [https://perma.cc/8WTH-HSA3].
330. Keri Blakinger, Newsrooms Are Rethinking Their Use of Mugshots in Crime Reporting, POYNTER (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.poynter.org/ethics-trust/2020/newsrooms-are-re
thinking-their-use-of-mugshots-in-crime-reporting [https://perma.cc/T6WZ-RZ5N].
331. Orlando Sentinel Discontinues Arrest Mugshots Database, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(June 12, 2020), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/about/os-ne-arrest-mugshots-databaseended-20200612-p4htez2i2fbzxnvz2cpgheuxoe-story.html [https://perma.cc/JF32-83HH].
332. Shan Wang, No Mugshot Exploitation Here: The New Haven Independent Aims to
Respect the Reputations of Those Arrested in the Community It Covers, NEIMANLAB (Feb. 14,
2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2017/02/no-mugshot-exploitation-here-thenew-haven-independent-aims-to-respect-the-reputations-of-those-arrested-in-the-communi
ty-it-covers/?relatedstory [https://perma.cc/29VC-QHQL].
333. Blake Kaplan, Why the Sun Herald Is Changing How It Covers Crime, SUN HERALD
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.sunherald.com/news/local/article223016770.html [https://per
ma.cc/N6HD-JMTF].
334. Callie Starnes, WRCB to Limit the Use of Mugshots, WRCB (June 19, 2020), https://
www.wrcbtv.com/story/42268515/wrcb-to-limit-the-use-of-mugshots [https://perma.cc/XWG
3-2KJE].
335. Rick Edmonds, Newspapers Hit With a Wave of Requests to Take Down Embarrassing Archived Stories, POYNTER (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.poynter.org/ethics-trust/2016/
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published. Newspaper editors have created adjudicatory processes
that resemble the expungement space to respond to the quantity of
requests they have received.336 The ethics editor for the USA Today
Network stated that “take-down requests are weighed on a caseby-case basis with senior editors, and some situations may require
legal guidance.”337
The Cleveland Plain-Dealer was one of the first newspapers to
launch a “right to be forgotten” experiment in 2018.338 Requests
tend to relate to identifying information in old news stories that
appear in the newspaper’s online archives.339 A committee considers these requests on a monthly basis and the paper reports approving nearly fifty percent of the requests.340 The editor asked
people to join the committee who he thought “would come in with
open minds and not be tied to dogmatic tradition.”341 The Boston
Globe has a “Fresh Start Initiative” that is similar to the process
at The Cleveland Plain-Dealer.342 At its outset, the Globe pointed
to the “nationwide reckoning on racial justice,” noting how past
stories can have a “lasting negative impact on someone’s ability to
move forward with their lives.”343
Why are media entities doing this? The tradition of journalism
as the first repository of history and the freedom of the press weigh
against it, but news entities point to the existence of the stories as
a “social issue” tied to membership in the community.344 The current criminal justice moment, plus the easy accessibility to people’s
past facilitated by the internet, has made the harm of perpetual

newspapers-hit-with-a-wave-of-requests-to-take-down-embarrassing-archived-stories [http
s://perma.cc/YHX8-2AXF].
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Chris Quinn, We’re Expanding Our Right-to-be-Forgotten Experiment,
CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Our Right-to-be-Forgotten Experiment], https:
//www.cleveland.com/metro/2018/09/were_expanding_our_right-to-be.html [https://perma.
cc/J2N5-XGZK]; Chris Quinn, Journalists Are Key to a Right to be Forgotten in the United
States, and Cleveland.com is Helping Spur the Conversation, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 11,
2020) [hereinafter Journalists Are Key], https://www.cleveland.com/news/2019/10/journali
sts-are-key-to-a-right-to-be-forgotten-in-the-united-states-and-clevelandcom-is-helping-spu
r-the-conversation.html [https://perma.cc/5VZA-XQ26].
339. See sources cited supra note 338.
340. See sources cited supra note 338.
341. Owen, supra note 328.
342. The Globe’s Fresh Start Initiative: Submit Your Appeal, BOS. GLOBE, https://
www.bostonglobe.com/2021/01/22/metro/globes-fresh-start-initiative-submit-your-appeal/?
p1=Article_Inline_Text_Link [https://perma.cc/LB7V-CK9R] (Jan. 22, 2021, 3:35 AM).
343. Id.
344. Id.
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news stories more visible. Reporting on crime with identifying information can have the unintended consequence of long-term stigmatic harm that needs remedying at a later date. Additionally, following up on older news stories to update them with positive
developments in someone’s life can make a huge difference in
reentry.
While the standards utilized by the media entities involved in
these determinations are neither uniform nor particularly transparent, for the more difficult cases, The Cleveland Plain-Dealer
asks “whether the value to the public of maintaining the stories
with names is greater than the value to the subjects of the stories
in having their names removed.”345 The Globe’s standard of review
is similar, stating “we think the value of giving someone a fresh
start often outweighs the historic value of keeping a story widely
accessible long after an incident occurred.” 346 During its review,
the Globe runs a background check of the applicant.347 And in the
FAQ section on its website, it identifies several factors considered
by the committee reviewing applications:
[T]he severity of the crime or incident; whether there is a pattern of
incidents; how long ago the story was published; how old the person
was at the time of the incident; whether the person involved was in a
position of public trust; and the value of keeping the information public.348

These considerations look very similar to the balancing that occurs under many formal expungement regimes, although it is privacy and media rights centric, rather than criminal justice focused.349
In terms of procedure and eligibility, the Globe’s Fresh Start Initiative is open to all, whether charged or convicted, or even if the
information in an article is noncriminal but damaging. Higher
standards exist for cases “involving public figures or serious
345. Journalists Are Key, supra note 338.
346. The Globe’s Fresh Start Initiative: Frequently Asked Questions, BOS. GLOBE, https:
//www.bostonglobe.com/2021/01/22/metro/globes-fresh-start-initiative-frequently-asked-qu
estions/?p1=Article_Inline_Text_Link [https://perma.cc/9JXC-CG4C] (Jan. 22, 2021, 3:48
AM).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. The Cleveland Plain-Dealer Editor, Chris Quinn, describes the two competing forces
as “tradition” (relating to newspapers as recorders of history) and “suffering” (felt by those
with damaged reputations). See Our Right-to-be-Forgotten Experiment, supra note 338;
Journalists Are Key, supra note 338; Radiolab: Right to be Forgotten, WNYC STUDIOS (Aug.
23, 2019), https://www.wnycstudios.org/podcasts/radiolab/articles/radiolab-right-be-forgott
en [https://perma.cc/YB7Z-ZUMP].
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crimes” than run-of-the-mill cases.350 The papers encourage applicants who do apply without the assistance of lawyers. The application is not too complicated, requiring identifying and demographic
information, the past news story, and any documents the requestor
thinks relevant, such as official records.351 Individuals also can
submit a personal narrative about why modification of the original
story is warranted.352 The Plain-Dealer’s request process is similar,
with an online application and contact email provided.353
III. COMPLETING EXPUNGEMENT THROUGH THE LIMITS OF
PUNISHMENT AND THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE ACTION
The primary contention in this Article is that addressing the
problem of expunged criminal records persisting post-expungement requires a significant counterweight to entrenched transparency norms and the realities of a surveillance-based economy that
is here to stay. There is a tradition of transparency when it comes
to the activities of the criminal justice system. The Supreme Court
has consistently reaffirmed access norms,354 and the availability of
public criminal records has followed. Further, the Court has regularly upheld the right of publishing entities and media agencies to
disseminate such information under the First Amendment.355 In
an age where anyone who uses the internet can claim the status of
a publisher under the First Amendment, limiting access or compelling erasure by private actors to mitigate harm in this regime is
both unlikely and unwise.
Further, existing theories of privacy have struggled to erect
strong privacy protections in the law. Any protections that did exist are now being overtly challenged by the age of surveillance. Privacy protections also cut against laws like the Freedom of Information Act, which reaffirm norms of access and transparency.356
Finally, protections for reputation are essentially nonexistent, and
to the extent that they exist, require piecemeal litigation. In short,
350. The Globe’s Fresh Start Initiative: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 346.
351. The Globe’s Fresh Start Initiative: Submit Your Appeal, supra note 342.
352. Id.
353. Fill This Form Out for Your Right to Be Forgotten, CLEVELAND.COM, https://
www.cleveland.com/metro/2019/01/fill-this-form-out-for-your-right-to-be-forgotten.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/6E9H-UF8D] (Feb. 16, 2021, 12:08 PM) (including email address for requests).
354. See supra notes 165–66.
355. See supra note 315.
356. See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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existing law has little to offer the successful expungement petitioner whose official criminal record has been expunged, only to
learn that information continues to exist and be shared by private
parties.
This Part responds to this legal quagmire and proposes two possible paths to deal with this problem, neither of which rests on privacy concepts. First, the theories of punishment underlying criminal justice itself provide an alternative path that moves away from
the privacy paradigm. Whether retributive or utilitarian, the philosophical and ethical presuppositions underlying the criminal law
and punishment, and how those institutions operate within a liberal, democratic society suggest limits on the furnishing of public
criminal records. This approach is somewhat extra-legal, simultaneously recognizing the limits of law and existing legal norms and
commitments, while calling on private actors to realize their relationship to the criminal system’s limits. The hope is to justify structures and frameworks that incentivize action on the part of private
actors that will counteract the formal limits of expungement law.
Highlighting the relationship of private actors to the institutions
of criminal law and criminal punishment is essential to minimizing
the amount of harm potentially caused by continued usage and dissemination of such information.
To be clear, this proposal steers in a different direction than development of a robust right to be forgotten enshrined in law. In
fact, it is built from the conclusion that such a right in American
law is neither likely to arise nor a wise policy pursuit. It concedes
that such a right is seriously problematic on First Amendment
grounds, demanding a degree of coercion that is antithetical to established norms in American law. Completing expungement after
official erasure requires something more foundational than simply
the force of law. The contention is that the remedy must develop
from what it means to be a participant in a democratic framework
that maintains a criminal law and institutions of punishment designed to reaffirm social norms without severing social bonds forever.357

357. See generally Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in
Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1487–88, 1490, 1496, 1513 (2016); Murray, supra note
32 (contending that the remedy should develop from restorative retributivism which focuses
on restoring the social implications and consequences of criminal law); Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2012) (contending that within liberal democracies, remedies for criminal laws should develop from a
political retributivist perspective); Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully
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A. Two Possible Paths for Addressing Private Use
This section contends that the corollaries to punishment theory
can serve as an effective counterweight to the norms and laws that
currently enable private entities to reflexively obtain, publish, and
use criminal record information. As Christopher Bennett has identified, this is the field of foreseeable harms that result from the
infliction of formal punishment, but that are experienced outside
the boundaries of the formal criminal system.358 Thus, there is an
important dichotomy at work: when the government officially inflicts punishment versus when private actors are permitted to inflict harms (whether formally labeled punitive or not) in the wake
of formal punishment. There is an argument to be made that state
permission of privately inflicted harm, built on utilizing criminal
record history information as a proxy for decision-making,
amounts to at least accessories to formal punishment, and therefore is, at the very least, punitive.359 If that holds, then theories of
punishment themselves can inform the regulation of private usage
of the information. And multiple theories of punishment can be utilized to serve this function, whether classically retributive, utilitarian, or restorative. Several scholars have persuasively demonstrated how retributivist and consequentialist theories, when
applied to the era of mass criminalization, contain proportionality
limits.360 Those limits can touch official recordkeeping361 and dissemination. This section builds on their work and others, as well
as my own, to propose a framework for dealing with the private
spaces with records.
Bennett’s observation suggests that if the foreseeable harms inflicted by private usage of the information are not “punishment,”
then theories of punishment can do some, but not all the work. For,
Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54
VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001) (contending that punishment should be developed based on the
wrong committed and blameworthiness to the offender).
358. Christopher Bennett, Invisible Punishment is Wrong – But Why? The Normative
Basis of Criticism of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 56 HOW. J. CRIME & CRIM. JUST.
480, 484 (2017).
359. A common counterpoint to this argument is that nonstate action cannot be punishment. That is a fair point, assuming certain premises, such as punishment, is only defined
by formal legal definition. But individual actors can act punitively even if not formally classified as punishment. For example, responding to the misbehavior of a child, without involving the state, can be punitive.
360. Scholars such as Jeffrie Murphy, Paul Robinson, Alice Ristroph, Mary Sigler, and
countless others have addressed this question. See supra notes 25, 28 and infra notes 362,
387.
361. Corda, supra note 26, at 46.
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if such harms are not punitive per se, but still the logical heirs to
formalized punishment, private actors, by virtue of participation
in a democratic society and in relationship to that system itself,
have a responsibility not to harm in a punitive fashion, or shall I
say, act punitively like official actors. A responsibility of participants in a democratic community is to refrain from acting like the
state. That is a burden of being in a shared democratic enterprise,
and of being in relation to the criminal law and its limits, suggesting the phrase, “doing the time” should actually mean something
in the private world. Whether we like it or not, we are all in relationship with the institutions of criminal law. Some go through it,
others work in it, and still others, by virtue of being outside of it,
are necessarily marking its limits. Hence, when private actors continue the stigma after the formal limits of the criminal law have
been utilized, they are dangerously close to usurping public authority to impose punishment. But even if that is unpersuasive, and
such harms are fully private and nonpunitive, the existence of relationships between parties in a shared, democratic enterprise suggests some responsibility for how to handle the information, rather
than just blind deference to the private will of individual actors
that has harmful effects downstream.362
In sum, whether we classify private holding and usage of already
expunged information as formally punitive or not only informs the
nature of the responsibility for handling the information, not
whether any responsibility exists at all. The contention is that creating legal structures by reference to these theoretical underpinnings of the criminal law and punishment itself, within a democratic community, has more promise than that offered by existing
law, which only builds from nebulous notions of privacy whose one
constant is being a state of flux. Specifically, renewed attention
must be paid to the role of the state as the sole punisher, which
implies the state determines when punishment ends and that private actors do not disrupt that judgment given their antecedent
consent to state responses to criminal behavior.363 This approach
highlights the societal and communal interest in fostering real
reentry, born from relationships within a shared democratic
362. See Mary Sigler, Defensible Disenfranchisement, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1725, 1733–38
(2014) (describing how the framework underlying liberal, democratic society presumes the
possibility of reintegration and the reinstallation of trust between those who have offended
and those who have not).
363. The state imposes restraints on itself through Constitutional provisions like the Ex
Post Facto Clause, Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, and the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
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project. It emphasizes the relational nature of the criminal law enterprise, however distanced in practice our culture, obsessed with
incarceration and its accessories, has become from those first principles. Ultimately, completing expungement demands some work
of the formal law, and investment in the relationships underlying
the law itself.
To be clear, the theory I propose below in sections III.B. and III.C
builds on the work of scholars and intellectual giants as well as
some prior work of my own. Various thinkers appear at different
times and depending on how the situation is diagnosed. For if the
persistent existence of such information in private hands and the
subsequent harms inflicted are conceived as punishment (despite
formal classification in law otherwise), then punishment theory
has a seat at the table. For that strand of the argument, I
pull from scholars mentioned previously—Murphy,364 Robinson,365
Ristroph,366 and others367—to piece together a set of principles that
could serve as a counterweight to the problem of the eternal criminal record and the usage of digitally elusive criminal record history information. The argument is that if private keeping and usage of such information is or extends punishment, or is an accessory
of formally classified punishment, then retributivist, utilitarian,
and expressivist theories of punishment, especially as they conceive proportionality, offer a counterweight to the perpetual availability and usage of such information. That is especially the case if
the state has already spoken with respect to an official expungement.
But if the use of such information is conceived as wholly civil,
beyond formal criminal law and punishment, and exclusively
within the realm of private harms, then something more qualified
is necessary to serve as a counterweight, although it cannot be
from within the privacy/reputation paradigm given the analysis in
Part II.368 In that situation, punishment theory can inform, but not
totally. It can only define where state activity should be exclusive,
thereby implying similar private activity is less justified within a

364. See supra note 28.
365. See supra note 25 and infra notes 384–85 and accompanying text.
366. See infra note 387 and accompanying text.
367. See generally infra sections III.B–D.
368. See generally supra section II.B.2.
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democratic system. The work of Bennett,369 Hoskins,370 Sigler,371
and Markel,372 building on theories of shared duties in a common
democratic enterprise, can help to make sense of the situation, calling on private actors to think twice before they reflexively use the
information.
B. The Punishment Theory Problems with Punitive Private Use
When the state grants an expungement, it has made multiple
judgments. First, it has decided that the stigma stemming from a
public criminal record should end.373 Second, it has decided that
formal contact between the state and the individual—via the public criminal record—should cease or be severely limited (in jurisdictions where sealing, rather than full expungement, is the
norm).374 Third, it has made a judgment about the individual pursuing the expungement: that rehabilitation is no longer in question
and that the risks to public safety are not sufficient to justify perpetual publicity.375 Finally, the state has determined that the elimination of the public criminal record will foster a journey towards
complete reintegration.376 All of these acts by the state relate to the
purposes of punishment, and what punishment is.
They correspond to what Alessandro Corda has labeled as the
purposes of criminal recordkeeping in the first place: notice to the
public that wrongdoing carries stigma.377 One purpose of public
criminal recordkeeping is to track, surveil, and hopefully deter additional criminal activity.378 This makes public criminal

369. See supra note 358 and infra notes 390, 398, 401, 407, 411–14, 418–21 and accompanying text.
370. See generally ZACHARY HOSKINS, BEYOND PUNISHMENT?: A NORMATIVE ACCOUNT
OF THE COLLATERAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION (2019) (discussing the moral
justifications of collateral legal consequences).
371. See supra notes 362 and infra notes 389–97 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
373. In many jurisdictions with expungement regimes, courts are tasked with determining whether the petitioner’s interests in rebuilding the petitioner’s reputation outweigh the
state’s interest in retaining the information. In states where automatic or “clean slate” laws
have been passed, the legislative justification involves a concern for how stigma from a criminal record inhibits reentry. See supra section I.B.
374. Expungement can mark the end of formal contact with the system, closing the book
(with a positive result) on a criminal case. See Murray, supra note 77, at 2841.
375. See Murray, supra note 10, at 711 (describing how existing expungement law is
built on utilitarian premises relating to rehabilitation and incapacitation).
376. See Radice, supra note 41, at 1369–70.
377. Corda, supra note 15, at 11.
378. Id.
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recordkeeping, in effect, an act of expressivist, incapacitative, and
general deterrence principles. This is why the practice has been
labeled punitive in effect,379 even if not formal punishment by law.
The implication of this is that the limits of punishment theory
are now fair game for restricting the continued existence of public
criminal records after expungement, and certainly when the records are created and maintained in the first place. Thus, imposing
something like proportionality constraints on the creation and
maintenance of criminal records—something Corda and others
propose380 through desert based and consequentialist principles—
makes sense. While that logic proposes a rationale for limiting the
default state position of official criminal records perpetuity, more
explanation is necessary as to how those principles inform private
use of such information.
Private use of already expunged information implicates punishment theory limits in two ways: (1) by allowing individuals to
usurp authority ceded to the state regarding the limits of punishment; and (2) as a matter of distribution, by allowing private actors
to act in ways that violate cardinal principles of proportionality reserved to the state. With respect to the first point, unreflective private use thrusts private actors into the role of the state after the
state itself—through the authority of the same private actors in a
liberal, democratic regime—has already cast judgment on the
plight and promise of the petitioner. More concretely, individuals
in a liberal, democratic regime cede to the state the sole authority
to make decisions about punishment. But when, after a judgment
about expungement, private actors continue to act punitively, and
solely on the basis of the information expunged by the state, private
actors are taking back the authority they ceded to the state. This
means, in effect, that private actors are asking the state to make
determinations of punishment or not, while simultaneously preserving the ability to do so individually after the fact. This is like a
contract premised on a false promise, where one party secretly
withholds consent. Hence, private use begins to look like unjustified double punishment that violates the core foundation of the
punishment regime in a democratic society: namely that the state
decides whether to punish or not in the name of the community.
Private use exhibits a desire to have one’s cake and eat it too.

379. See id. at 46.
380. Id. at 43–44; Hugh Lafollette, Collateral Consequences of Punishment: Civil Penalties Accompanying Formal Punishment, 22 J. APPLIED PHIL. 241, 246–47 (2005).
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This has significant implications for the foundational principles
underlying the criminal law and punishment, affecting their legitimacy. Because if the formal levers of the state—again founded
upon the consent of individuals who have ceded authority to the
state to act in this fashion—are not the end of the matter, then the
state was never a singular authority in the first place. Private punitive use becomes the real punishment after the window-dressing
that is the formal system. It suggests the formalized punishment
process misrepresents the real adjudication, meaning it is only a
precursor. And that holds despite other core constitutional principles—like the Double Jeopardy Clause—suggest formal processes
should end the matter. It undercuts any trust between communities who judge through the criminal law and forgive (or forget)
through expungement and those who violated the rules of the community.
The second way in which punishment theory implicates private
use is that if private use is punitive, it is far too punitive by any
serious conception of proportionality, whether understood as a
matter of retributivist or consequentialist principles. Proportionality principles aim to ensure that punishment fits the crime. Cardinal and ordinal proportionality principles suggest that a default
posture of permanency for any type of record—arrest versus conviction, murder versus turnstile jumping—flips this calculus on its
head. Thus, for instance, following others, I have argued previously
that the original decision by states to make all records public and
for the same amount of time violates this core principle.381
But how would that affect private use? State permitted private
use enables private actors to engage in activity that upends any
prior proportionality calculation made by the state. And when you
consider that the formal act of expungement actually is designed
to cease the continued imposition of stigma-based harm, subsequent state permission allows private actors to undo that state
judgment. In other words, the state, by refraining from any intervention post-expungement, is permitting the disruption of its own
prior efforts relating to proportionality.382 It undercuts the finality
of its own judgment.

381. See Murray, supra note 10, at 680–81 (citing Corda, supra note 15, at 6).
382. Ekow Yankah advances a similar argument with respect to a “right to reintegration.” Ekow Yankah, The Right to Reintegration, 23 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 74, 74 (2020) (noting
how the same justification that “requires protecting civic equality through punishment compels the state to reintegrate offenders after punishment”).
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As a matter of distribution, private use is problematic on retributivist and consequentialist proportionality grounds. Retributivist
proportionality holds that only the punishment that is due should
be meted out.383 While that concept is mystical to many and underlies one of the chief criticisms of retributivist principles, others
have held that it at least imposes barriers on the range of activity
that is permitted.384 While a precise proportionality calculation is
difficult to measure, what is not proportional is not as difficult.
Scholars like Paul Robinson have built on this line of thinking to
suggest that democratically-informed understandings of desert allow for a careful threading of the needle.385 This could enable something like the creation of a window that is open for a period time
and permits permissible private use—sanctioned by law—before
the proportionality calculus is disrupted. Thus, for example,
FCRA’s supposed limit on reporting arrest information after seven
years386 could inform limits of use by private actors after a period
of time. Private actors, based on what was written above, are then
acknowledged as partners in ensuring that proportionality principles are not violated.
Consequentialist understandings of proportionality have been
lauded as less mystical, more capable of measurement, and thereby
a better source for legitimate proportionality constraints.387 With
respect to criminal records, the idea is that persistent existence
and use is in fact, on balance, criminogenic, which inflicts unjustified costs on the individual (who returns to the system) and the
state (who must pay for that return).388 State permission of private
use that fosters this type of criminogenic effect then goes too far,
especially for someone judged worthy of expungement by the state.
Thus, when employers or landlords or schools reject applicants,
and those rejections are causally connected to criminal activity
down the road, private activity has upended the proportionality
calculation made by the state. When one considers that expungement regimes are largely built on cost-benefit principles, where
courts are tasked with balancing harms and benefits to the
383. See generally Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL., https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/justice-retributive [https://perma.cc/2SYX-6LK9] (July 31, 2020).
384. See Paul H. Robinson, Empirical Desert, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 29, 31
(Stephen Garvey et al. eds., 2009).
385. See id.
386. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2).
387. See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE
L.J. 263, 268–69, 273–74 (2005).
388. See Leasure & Anderson, supra note 39, at 271, 279.
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individual and state from expungement, private use of already expunged information essentially negates the judgment and legitimacy of that regime.
C. The Democratic Problems with Nonpunitive Private Use
For those skeptical that private use can be construed as punitive, there is an alternative route for questioning such use, premised on the core framework underlying a liberal, democratic regime. Mary Sigler, borrowing from R.A. Duff, spoke of “civic trust”
underlying the relationships between members of a political community.389 This trust implies rights and responsibilities, vis-à-vis
relations to one another and to the state. One of the included responsibilities involves cognizance of foreseeable harms inflicted by
the state and responding to them. Christopher Bennett moves from
that idea to his theory of “associational duties” between members
of a political community, such that awareness of collateral consequences is expected.390 The glue here is what Bennett calls “a special kind of relationship.”391
Sigler, in the context of defending some forms of disenfranchisement, describes how lawbreakers violate this “civic trust” through
their wrongdoing, and therefore the state and private actors can
require verification of worthiness for new trust before extending
previously existing rights, like the right to vote.392 But notice the
corollary: once that worthiness has been confirmed—either
through the action of the individual or through judgment of the
state—what ground does the private individual have for not mitigating harms? In the case of the individual with an already expunged record, private use rejects a responsibility on the part of
the private actor to recognize the judgment that the person is worthy of restoration moving forward.
This notion of private responsibility runs counter to the default,
libertarian, or contractual position that private actors are free to
respond how they see fit. So why do private actors with this information in their hands have a responsibility? As Sigler points out,
the “conception of citizens as officeholders draws on the classical
389. Sigler, supra note 362, at 1733–34 (citing RA Duff, Pre-trial Detention and the Presumption of Innocence, in PREVENTION AND THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 115, 123 (Andrew Ashworth et al. eds., 2013)).
390. Bennett, supra note 358, at 482.
391. Id.
392. Sigler, supra note 362, at 1736–38.
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notion of officium, or duty,” meaning citizenship “is a position of
distinctive responsibility.”393 Thus, the default posture that the
state cannot use law at all to affect private actor decision-making
is not consistent with a robust understanding of what it means to
be a member of a democratic political community,394 where libertarian sensibilities are never taken to their extremes and the law
can mediate between conflicting interests. As Sigler states: “[t]he
bottom line of this account is that the responsibilities of citizenship
are broader than the most individualistic versions of liberalism
and less demanding than the most ambitious forms of republicanism.”395
This is how private expungement connects with ethical responsibility, suggesting an extra-legal rationale for something akin to
the right to be forgotten. The crux of the matter is that by virtue of
membership in a political community, individuals are in a relationship, whether they like it or not.396 They have responsibilities,
whether they like them or not, to act mindful of civic virtue, which
necessarily entails openness to reintegration of lawbreakers, especially those persons whom expungement processes have adjudicated worthy of reintegration.397
This undeniably cuts against the grain embedded in a societal
culture that defaults to private self-determination unless gross
harms ensue. As mentioned above, even access principles developed from the right to know all things relating to governmental
activity stem from that understanding. In contrast, the idea of relationship here contemplates a social situation where individuals
move beyond self-regarded pursuits,398 recognizing a common enterprise with public values. As Bennett puts it, by virtue of being
“fellow participants in a collective democratic enterprise,”399 individuals must be mindful of not extending the effects of formal punishment. This necessarily implies an openness to second chances.
393. Id. at 1734–35.
394. Yankah, supra note 382, at 76 (“[R]eintegration presses the question: What does
liberal democracy owe to even those citizens it rightfully punishes?”).
395. Sigler, supra note 362, at 1735.
396. The idea that human beings are in a default position of relationship is not novel.
See generally ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence Irwin trans., 3d ed. 2019).
397. Sigler, supra note 362, at 1736 (citing Duff, supra note 389, at 123) (“[C]itizens also
‘owe it to each other to recognize each other as fellows: not to assume in advance that others
are enemies who might attack . . . and against whom [one] need[s] to guard [oneself].’”);
Yankah, supra note 382, at 80 (noting how reintegration complements the responsibility of
the state to punish).
398. Sigler, supra note 362, at 1736.
399. Bennett, supra note 358, at 482.
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And there is no question that the furnishing of second chances is a
public, cultural value and good, and is, in fact legally sanctioned
with a remedy like expungement.400 Expungement remedies thus
simultaneously signal two things: the seriousness of requiring
prior offenders to show they are worthy of trust and the reality that
a compromised past does not result in permanent exile from the
political community.401 For the person who has achieved expungement, it is not unreasonable to expect that the law incentivize private actors to recognize those two points.
What does this mean for the handling of criminal records? First,
it seems that private furnishing and use of records in a permanent
sense runs actors dangerously close to complicity in permanently
preventing reintegration to a class of individuals otherwise judged
worthy of a second chance. Second, it begs contemplation, by private actors, of how their actions perpetuate or reinforce foreseeable
harms from the operation of formal law and punishment, and legitimate recordkeeping by the state. As Bennett suggests, we are
dealing with a set of “foreseeable collateral harms of punishment[,]”
inflicted by private actors.402
Thus, the criminal-civil distinction that normally allows private
actors to elide the restraints of punishment cannot save the day
entirely. The reality is that any cause the private actor would cite
as motivation for the action is necessarily entangled with the offense, as reported by the criminal record.403 Nor is it enough to report that the underlying conduct, rather than the conviction reported by the criminal record, justifies private liberty to act as one
sees fit. This is because awareness of foreseeable harms imposes
some responsibility, even if not the same as that for intentionally
caused harms. This, of course, is a principle already enshrined in
both criminal and civil (tort) law, where the range of duties of private actors calibrates to mens rea concepts.404

400. Other laws also furnish second chances. The most recent law to be passed, the First
Step Act, gives nonviolent offenders a second chance through modification of their sentences. See generally First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.
401. See Sigler, supra note 362, at 1737.
402. Bennett, supra note 358, at 484.
403. Id. at 483–84 (“Whether civil or criminal . . ., however, these are still deprivations
or harms to which the offender is liable because of their offence, and so it can (justifiably)
seem like hair-splitting to insist that the labeling marks an important principled difference.” (citing Andrew von Hirsch & Martin Wasik, Civil Disqualifications Attending Conviction: A Suggested Conceptual Framework, in THE CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 599 (M.J.
Prichard ed., 1997)).
404. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (AM. L. INST. 1962).
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In other words, where restraints on formal punishment end, the
recognition that such responsibilities exist within a broader moral
and legal framework begins. Josh Kleinfeld, in his theory of reconstructivism, calls this how punishment theory is “nestled within a
broader theory of justice.”405 Similarly, older forms of retributivism
hold the same,406 and even Robinson’s work, which defers to the
empirically validated moral judgments of the community, suggests
a framework beyond the formalized purposes of the criminal law407
This is the crux of why the formal, criminal-civil distinction cannot
be dispositive when it comes to the question of private interaction
with the those attempting to reenter.408 Private actors, by virtue of
their relationship to the punishment apparatus and the offender,
do not have a morally “free hand”409 merely because the moral
norms underlying the formal criminal law are no longer the only
considerations in play.
And neither does the state. Bennett describes a how a teacher
tasked with supervising the thesis of a mentee has the responsibility to simultaneously punish when necessary but not abandon the
mentee, lest the entire project of mentorship be lost.410 Something
similar exists with respect to the state and punishment, and the
state’s permission for private actors to act without consequence.
Bennett states: “it would be a failure in the way society administers punishment if it were simply to impose it and walk away: it
would be a denial of the kind of relationship that obtains between
the one making the criticism and the one receiving it.”411 Ekow
Yankah makes a similar point when describing that while “legal
punishment is embedded in the very social project of our living together as a civic community[,]” “criminal law represents a reciprocal duty that flows between a citizen and their civic community.”412
Put simply, the state and private actors are in “special relationship” with each other and with those who encounter the system.413
405. Kleinfeld, supra note 357, at 1556.
406. Murray, supra note 49, at 877–81.
407. See generally Robinson, supra note 384 (noting how desert-based theories of punishment, grounded in the views of the community, suggest boundaries and degrees of nuance beyond the formalistic assignments made by existing criminal law).
408. Bennett, supra note 358, at 486 (“[P]unishment takes place against the background
of other duties that we have to the offender, and which cannot all be seen as cancelled by
the offence.”).
409. Id. at 487.
410. Id. at 482.
411. Id. at 488.
412. Yankah, supra note 382, at 81–82.
413. Bennett, supra note 358, at 482, 488. Bennett talks about grounding duties to
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And these relationships exist and persist and go deeper than voluntary assumption of responsibilities; they are not reducible to
contractual terms or value assigned by the parties.414 They are inescapable social realities that engender serious responsibility.
Bennett, and others,415 call this “citizenship,”416 resembling Sigler’s concept of office-holding. Like Sigler, Bennett notes how citizenship is not simply characterized by being “subject [to] an authority.”417 Instead, it involves participation “in that authority; . . .
in some sense having responsibility for the care and sustenance of
that community.”418 Returning the issue of use of already expunged
criminal records, private actors participate in the authority of the
community when they recognize the judgment of the state regarding an expungement as valid. Furthermore, acknowledging that
they do not possess a morally free hand is consistent with the idea
that they have a responsibility for the well-being of the community
as a whole and individuals within that community. The people who
comprise a political community—whether they have contacted the
criminal system or not—remain in relationship and thereby have
duties to one another and to the entire enterprise.
Coupling these ideas with the notion that criminal wrongdoing
does not permanently sever relationship419 with the community
suggests that there is an argument for private responsibility towards ex-offenders who have been judged worthy of reintegration
by the state. Otherwise, private actors can actively resist the
restitching of social bonds that the criminal system is tasked with
pursuing and that underlie the entire project itself.420 It also would
undermine collective self-governance in a democratic society,421
and undercut the social equality that the state has said is warranted through an act of expungement that was authorized by the
offenders with human rights, but instead opts for a framework built on the relationships
underlying membership in a political community. He states that we have a “richer set of
duties to those with whom we are in particular kinds of relationships.” Id. at 490.
414. Id.
415. See, e.g., AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE
DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL (2014).
416. Bennett, supra note 358, at 491.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Yankah, supra note 382, at 83 (describing how a punishment regime that presumes
civic equality necessarily must be open to restoration of that equality).
420. Bennett, supra note 358, at 492 (“[P]unishment regimes can play a significant role
in denying individuals the benefits of social membership to which they are due.”); see Kleinfeld, supra note 367, at 1523–24.
421. Bennett, supra note 358, at 492.
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community composed of the same private actors. To do otherwise
means that private actors are permitted to deny official judgments
after they occur, undercutting the very agency underlying the entire system itself, and creating a de facto class of second-class citizens.422 Criminal recordkeeping, in perpetuity, runs directly counter to the cultivation of the social fabric articulated here.423 And
the use of such records without restraint (legal or moral) stunts the
development of the capacities of individuals who have contacted
the system yet been judged worthy of restoration through the formal act of expungement. State judgments regarding restoration
that are authorized by private actors through the legal system
must count for something.
D. The Role of Law
How can the above ideas inform how the law interacts with private actors who seek to use such information? Given co-existing
legal commitments relating to property, speech, and privacy (or the
lack thereof), the law’s ability to tackle persistent use of privately
held criminal records is limited. With that said, there are some
ways that the law could incentivize private action.
First, civil law could consider subsidizing action that mitigates
harm to ex-offenders who have achieved expungement. While existing expungement law in some states permits successful petitioners to deny the existence of a prior criminal record without being
accused of lying, law also could reward private actors, such as employers, for hiring those who have contacted the system. How this
reward might take shape is beyond the scope of this Article, but
there is no reason why something like tax benefits for employers
could not be part of the equation. Another possibility would involve
public-private partnerships that create pipelines to steady employment in a particular industry.424 Alternatively, the state could
422. Id. at 493; Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 281, 296, 299 (2006).
423. Lerman and Weaver make a similar argument in ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP, and
about several aspects of the formal legal system. LERMAN & WEAVER, supra note 415, at 95;
Bennett, supra note 358, at 496 (focusing on improperly motivated police stops repeatedly
injuring relationships within the community and to the state); Yankah, supra note 382, at
107 (“A state committed to the full reintegration of citizens should have the permanent
erasure of one’s criminal history as its default rule.”).
424. An initiative like this could have a secondary effect on insurance markets and costs
for employers. If insurance carriers witness increased hiring of individuals the carriers
deem risky, that could result in financial hurt for employers purchasing insurance relating
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supplement private good will by alleviating financial burdens on
employers in other ways. Such structures are synergistic with creating a choice architecture425 that is pro-reentry.
Granted, one objection to such a proposal might be that such
support would unfairly result in a preference for the formerly convicted over the nonconvicted. But can we be so sure? There might
be some employers who still prefer to hire individuals who have
never encountered the system, and they would be free to go on doing so for the reasons they see fit, as long as such practices comply
with employment laws. But that does not preclude the law from
encouraging, but not mandating, giving ex-offenders a second look.
Moreover, a philosophical response to such an objection is warranted. If punishment is designed to restore baseline civic equality
through the proportional imposition of desert or some other measure, then once punishment is over it is hardly unjust to assist in
reentry through measures that limit the punitive reach of the state
or private actors undercutting state judgments about punishment
in the first place.
A second initiative might involve the state investing heavily in
ensuring that those who have achieved expungement are able to
actually capitalize on that achievement through the restoration of
their reputation. This would involve commitment to digital certificates of relief that mitigate the effects of technology that affect the
promise of expungement. Certificates of relief are available from
judges in some jurisdictions.426 But in many respects, their utility
resembles the same issues that come with achieving an expungement on paper. How is the certificate made known to the wider
community to counteract the negative effects of a public criminal
record? Why are certificates of relief not available at the click of a
button, just like public criminal records? Could achieving an expungement allow for connecting successful petitioners with reputation management firms that can alleviate the burdens of digital
records? The government could bundle a successful expungement
to on-the-job accidents or crime. That said, insurance markets would likely catch up to the
data that shows that riskiness is significantly diminished for those who have achieved official expungement. See generally Prescott & Starr, supra note 67 (finding that those who
obtain expungement have extremely low subsequent crime rates as compared to the general
population and experience an upturn in their wage and employment trajectories).
425. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (generally arguing that
changes in behavior through choice architecture and structures can achieve the same objectives as formal policy changes).
426. Judicial Certificates of Relief: A National Survey, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES.
CTR. (Aug. 26, 2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/2020/08/26/judicial-certificates-of-relief-anational-survey [https://perma.cc/T7LH-87L4].
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with a set of services that aim towards digital restoration. Private
firms already invest heavily in managing their reputations. There
might also be room for public-private partnership here as well.
Reputation management firms could engage in pro bono work for
those who have achieved expungement. Setting up such apparatuses might help private actors make decisions that account for the
foreseeable harms described above.
A related effort on the part of the state could involve a messaging
campaign to private actors to try to move the needle. Similar campaigns have worked to alter private action when the government
has characterized previously understood private harms as also involving the public good. The most well-known probably involves
anti-smoking campaigns on the basis of potential individual harm
and the harms associated with secondary smoke. Between the mid1980s and early 2000s it was nearly impossible to avoid such messaging. By the mid to late 2000s, private actors had realized that
there was a market opportunity to attract consumers by accommodating the preferences of nonsmokers over smokers. Restaurants
moved from having smoking sections to requiring smokers to go
outside entirely. Similarly, messaging relating to how private use
of criminal record information that has been expunged perpetuates
harm and undercuts democratic principles could lead some private
actors to rethink binary sorting between ex-offenders and those
who have not contacted the system.
While the above initiatives are a start, they also concede that
the role of law will be limited given existing legal frameworks.
Hence, private initiative is necessary to help those who have
achieved expungement to fully reenter. In the past two decades,
the role of corporations and private firms moving the needle for
social issues has become more apparent. Professional sports organizations, entertainment entities, public figures, such as athletes
and media personalities, have advocated for certain issues. But
there has been no widespread campaign to give those who have
achieved expungement a second chance. The responsibilities of
participating in a democratic regime suggest more can be done in
this field to broaden public and private awareness of the collective
obligation to assist members of the community as they attempt to
rejoin and become productive.
CONCLUSION
Achieving an expungement marks the end of a long road within
the criminal justice system and should confirm the beginning of a
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second chance. Official recognition that one has been rehabilitated,
is not so risky as to require continued stigma, and is capable of full
reintegration into society is a judgment left to the state by expungement law. But the reach of that judgment is limited by the
law itself, which simultaneously permits private actors to undo or
undercut its effect in various walks of life.
This norm is entrenched and unlikely to go away. Theories of
privacy or reputation are in a state of flux in a surveillance economy where the invasion of privacy or the cultivation of reputation
are the primary capital and currency. Thus, the right to be forgotten—as conceived in non-American legal regimes—is unlikely to
manifest in any robust form in American law. This reality thereby
requires conception of alternative paths for legal reform when it
comes to helping those who have achieved expungement, but then
find out that the criminal record information remains and is used
almost freely by private actors.
Because a privacy/reputation paradigm is not up to the task of
countering the transparency and access norms that are buttressed
by the First Amendment and statutory law, an alternative rationale for completing the effect of an expungement is necessary to
move the needle. The core claim here is that there are two possible
paths, both of which relate to theories of punishment. First, recognition that private use resembles formal punishment or, in other
words, is punitive, opens the door to the constraints of punishment
theory. Second, even if private use is not punishment, the relationships underlying the limits of the criminal law in a broader democratic regime suggest a set of responsibilities for private actors that
go beyond the dominant laissez-faire attitude towards the plight of
those who have achieved expungement. In short, an alternative rationale for assisting reentry must be grounded in something foundational: the relationships underlying criminal law, punishment,
and shared existence within a liberal, democratic regime.
While that rationale has been presented here, it also concedes
that the role of law is limited given other core legal commitments
in American law. Norms of access and transparency are goods, and
to disturb them with coercive erasure of privately held information,
or to prevent access entirely, would be to undercut other democratic values. But as with most attempts to use the law as both a
sword and a shield, the goal lies somewhere in the middle. The rationale articulated here suggests that there is a way to incentivize
reentry by encouraging limited private possession and use while
not taking it away entirely. The law can help private actors use or
not use this information more charitably. Coupled with well-
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informed private initiative, completing expungement becomes
much more achievable.

